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This thesis analyses the traditional approach and methodology used to conduct 
digital forensic information capture, analysis and investigation. The predominant 
toolsets and utilities that are used and the features that they provide are reviewed. 
This is used to highlight the difficulties that are encountered due to both 
technological advances and the methodologies employed. It is suggested that these 
difficulties are compounded by the archaic methods and proprietary formats that are 
used. 
An alternative framework for the capture and storage of information used in digital 
forensics is defined named the `Digital Evidence Bag' (DEB). A DEB is a universal 
extensible container for the storage of digital information acquired from any digital 
source. The format of which can be manipulated to meet the requirements of the 
particular information that is to be stored. The format definition is extensible thereby 
allowing it to encompass new sources of data, cryptographic and compression 
algorithms and protocols as developed, whilst also providing the flexibility for some 
degree of backwards compatibility as the format develops. 
The DEB framework utilises terminology to define its various components that are 
analogous with evidence bags, tags and seals used for traditional physical evidence 
storage and continuity. This is crucial for ensuring that the functionality provided by 
each component is comprehensible by the general public, judiciary and law 
enforcement personnel without detracting or obscuring the evidential information 
contained within. 
Furthermore, information can be acquired from a dynamic or more traditional static 
environment and from a disparate range of digital devices. The flexibility of the DEB 
framework permits selective and/or intelligent acquisition methods to be employed 
together with enhanced provenance and continuity audit trails to be recorded. 
Evidential integrity is assured using accepted cryptographic techniques and 
algorithms. 
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The DEB framework is implemented in a number of tool demonstrators and applied 
to a number of typical scenarios that illustrate the flexibility of the DEB framework 
and format. 
The DEB framework has also formed the basis of a patent application. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Digital Forensics - The problem 
Digital / computer forensics is one of the more immature and relatively new forms of 
forensic science. In addition to that the technology to which digital forensic 
techniques and a scientific rigorous approach is applied are also changing at a 
phenomenally rapid rate. 
In contrast to digital forensics in which the processes and procedures are not well 
defined, the `wet' forms of forensic science such as dactylography (fingerprints) 
(Thinkquest 2004), (German 2007) and DNA (Butler 2005) are much more formally 
established (Pyrek 2007). The processes and procedures are well defined (DOJ 2003) 
and the raw material to which those processes and procedures are applied are not 
changing (no more than the human DNA microbiological makeup is evolving). 
The rate of technological change makes it even more vitally important to record the 
processes, methods, tools and actions taken on digital evidence, and the work 
described in this thesis proposes a solution that is capable of recording these. In 
addition to that the provenance, chain of custody and integrity of the digital evidence 
should be maintained just as it would be with more traditional forensic sciences. This 
however is not currently the case in the digital environment. The digital world is 
very good at providing mechanisms to help assure data integrity but is currently very 
poor at providing mechanisms to record provenance, processes, methods, tools and 
actions. To accomplish this, the investigator / examiner has to resort to manually 
recording these aspects of the examination. Although not difficult to perform it does 
rely on a rigorous and studious approach on the part of the investigator but does not 
allow the integrity to be independently verified. 
Another dimension that compounds these problems in the digital forensic field is the 
sheer quantity of information that can be stored on a digital device and the rate at 
which this is increasing (Thompson & Best 2000). This incurs additional backup 
overheads and increases the time to thoroughly parse and examine all of the digital 
information collected as part of an investigation. The procedure of capturing all 
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available data from, for instance, a computer hard disk drive and examining the 
clone or image file has not changed since computer forensics was first undertaken in 
the early 1980's. 
Digital forensics is normally seen as taking a static approach to digital investigations, 
however with `live' investigations and data capture from a system that is up and 
running the methods and tools that are used are even less well defined, and any data 
obtained during this live acquisition is rarely compatible in format to that obtained 
during a static acquisition. This means different toolsets are used and the investigator 
has to be very technically astute; to the extent that we are even seeing some 
investigators specialising in `network' or `live' digital forensics. Indeed performing a 
basic live data capture will soon be the norm as it becomes more recognised that 
capturing the contents of memory, a process list, or list of network connections from 
the dynamic environment may well aid the investigation. This contains information 
that would be advantageous to have but is totally lost once a static approach is 
undertaken. Furthermore, if a proactive approach is adopted when the investigator 
arrives at a crime scene and is faced with a live system, then the recognition of 
encrypted volumes and such schemes may well allow the investigation to proceed 
without additional delays and costs that may be incurred to circumvent such 
protection at a later date. In extreme cases these methods may well render the seized 
digital media totally worthless from an investigatory perspective. 
This thesis predominantly discusses the investigation of Microsoft operating systems 
and filing systems as these are the most commonly encountered by practitioners and 
documented (Steel 2006) (Carrier 2005) (Sammes & Jenkinson 2000). The most 
widely used commercial forensic tools are also built to handle these systems. The 
principles and practices discussed are equally applicable to other operating systems 
(e. g. Unix, Apple Machintosh, etc. ) and filing systems (e. g. EXT2, EXT3, HFS, 
etc. ). 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
The objective of this work is to address the problems stated in section 1.1 and 
produce a framework that is capable of recording the provenance, processes, 
methods, tools and actions taken by the investigator. 
Such a framework should permit an efficient and scaleable storage of digital 
information captured and should allow information to be captured to evidential 
standards from both static and live environments, safe in the knowledge that once 
that information has been seized not only the integrity of the information is 
maintained but provenance is also recorded. 
A framework that can successfully achieve these objectives may even lead to the 
possibility of new forensic investigation methodologies being developed. 
A by-product of this would be to harmonise the digital forensic techniques and tools 
that can be applied to the investigation of an ever increasing range of disparate 
digital devices. 
1.3 Original Contribution 
A critical analysis of current methodologies and problems encountered in the digital 
forensic arena is performed (section 2.1 to 2.3). This is used to identify a set of 
requirements that digital forensic imaging and analysis tools should possess (section 
2.4). As a result of this an original solution has been developed which addresses 
many of these issues. The solution as described in this thesis is named the Digital 
Evidence Bag (DEB), section 3. 
A DEB is a universal storage container for digital information, which may be used as 
evidence, and is collected from a disparate range of digital devices in either a static 
or live environment. The process that is undertaken to capture the digital information 
is also recorded. 
A sufficiently detailed definition has been formulated to permit a patent application 
to be filed defining a scaleable and novel solution that is capable of recording the 
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provenance, processes, methods, tools and actions taken by the investigator during 
the course of digital evidence acquisition and analysis. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This thesis examines and addresses a number of areas not previously considered or at 
least documented in the digital forensics field. The chapters are organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses the influential stakeholders in the digital forensic arena and then 
presents an overview of the current digital investigation process, methodology and 
tools. A number of problems with current practice are identified that leads to the 
definition of requirements for a digital evidence imaging system. 
In Chapter 3 the importance of provenance is considered, and attributes that 
characterise `good' provenance are defined. This is an area of digital evidence that is 
often overlooked, but is key to providing reliable and repeatable evidence. The 
abstract DEB framework is presented together with a description of the various 
components that comprise a DEB. The sequence that should be adopted when a DEB 
is created together with the DEB access protocol used during the course of an 
investigation is also defined. A number of DEB tools were created in order to test the 
DEB framework and examine the functionality and usability of the system. 
Chapter 4 discusses the applications that have been written that are capable of 
creating a DEB, both in a traditional static environment - an imaging tool (DEB 
imager) and also able to capture information from a real-time incident response 
environment (DEB Application Wrapper). Additionally, a tool was also created that 
was capable of viewing the contents of a DEB (DEB Viewer) in order to demonstrate 
and test the protocols that are undertaken when the information contained in a DEB 
is examined and analysed during the course of the investigation. 
In Chapter 5. the DEB framework is applied to a number of possible digital 
investigation scenarios. This demonstrates how the DEB framework can be 
implemented in current scenarios and illustrates how new intelligent and selective 
imaging practices can be accommodated. 
Page 4 
A comparison of the DEB framework with other digital evidence storage formats is 
conducted in Chapter 6. This highlights the range of features, flexibility and 
extensibility of the DEB approach. The final chapter, Chapter 7, draws the 
conclusions of the research and gives some recommendations for further work. 
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2 Digital Forensics Background & Related Work 
2.1 The Influential Stakeholders of the Digital Forensic Process 
As digital forensics is a relatively new branch of forensic science the framework and 
processes that are undertaken throughout the lifecycle of an investigation have only 
recently been discussed and documented (Kovacich & Jones 2006) (Casey 2004). As 
such, there are no internationally defined standards in this area. The main influencing 
communities are digital forensic practitioners, academia and legislative. The 
practitioner skill and knowledge base is driven from the Law Enforcement community 
that regularly attends crime scenes and performs search and seizure operations in 
order to secure digital evidence. The academia dimension is driven by the requirement 
to gain an understanding of the overall process and produce innovative solutions to 
address the technical challenges which digital evidence can encapsulate. The other 
aspect that greatly influences the digital investigation process is the law and 
legislation that is used to define offences and prosecute offenders. These areas will 
now be discussed in further detail and from this a number of requirements are 
identified. 
2.1.1 Law Enforcement 
From the law enforcement perspective, certainly within the UK, the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) provides advice and guidance to UK law enforcement. 
In the area of digital forensics ACPO have developed a `Good Practice Guide for 
Computer Based Electronic Evidence' (ACPO 2003). This guide as well as providing 
some background technical advice defines four main principles that should be applied 
when investigating any computer or digital system. These are :- 
Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents should 
change data held on a computer or storage media which may subsequently be relied 
upon in count. 
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This gives rise to the requirement to provide a means to be able to verify that the data 
presented at court is identical to that acquired from the original media. This assurance 
is usually achieved in the digital forensic arena using cryptographic integrity checks. 
Principle 2: In exceptional circumstances, where a person finds it necessary to access 
original data held on a computer or on storage media, that person must be competent 
to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of 
their actions. 
The ability to be able to explain technical aspects of an investigation in a way that can 
be easily understood in a court, tribunal or even in a case study for training purposes 
is an essential skill for the law enforcement practitioner. 
Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer based 
electronic evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party 
should be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result. 
This identifies another requirement; to record an audit trail of actions and applications 
(including version number) that could be used to perform independent verification of 
examination results and findings. This also aids the process of dual-tool verification 
and the ability to identify discrepancies between various different toolsets and 
alternate versions of the same tool. 
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation (the case officer) has overall 
responsibility for ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to. 
The overall premise of these principles is that digital evidence is treated as if it were 
paper based ... `doctrine of documentary evidence may be explained thus: the onus is 
on the prosecution to show to the court that the evidence produced is no more and no 
less not than when it lt'as first taken into the possession of the police. ' 
Whilst these principles are very broad and not specific to any particular make, model 
or type of device they provide the premise, cornerstone and requirements of how all 
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systems should be handled if credible evidence is to be secured, documented, 
managed and processed. 
2.1.2 Academia 
Prior to 2001 there was little collaboration between academia and the real-world' 
experiences from practitioners and the legal community. This problem was identified 
and culminated in the creation of the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) 
supported by the US DoD Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). 
The initial goal of the DFRWS gathering was to unite military, civilian, law 
enforcement and research professionals to define a framework for digital forensic 
science. This has resulted in a more formal understanding of the digital forensic 
process (DFR WS 2001) and the phases that are undertaken as part of the investigative 
process. The following phases and associated techniques or methods belonging to 
each phase were identified: 
9 Identification - Event/Crime Detection, Resolve Signature, Profile Detection, 
Anomalous Detection, Complaints, System Monitoring, Audit Analysis; 
" Preservation - Case Management, Imaging Technologies, Chain of Custody, 
Time Synchronisation; 
" Collection - Preservation, Approved Methods, Approved Software, Approved 
Hardware, Legal Authority, Lossless Compression, Sampling, Data Reduction, 
Recovery Techniques; 
" Examination - Preservation, Traceability, Validation Techniques, Filtering 
Techniques, Pattern Matching, Hidden Data Discovery, Hidden Data 
Extraction; 
" Analysis - Preservation, Traceability, Statistical. Protocols, Data Mining, 
Timeline, Link, Spatial; 
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" Presentation - Documentation, Expert Testimony, Clarification, Mission 
Impact Statement, Recommended Countermeasure, Statistical Interpretation: 
" Decision. 
Within the DFRWS framework, an investigation is very much seen as a linear 
process. However, certainly within the examination and analysis phases iterative tasks 
would be undertaken. 
The techniques and methods assigned to each of the phases of an investigation also 
highlight additional requirements some of which are considered mandatory e. g. Chain 
of Custody, Approved Methods, Preservation, Traceability, whilst others appear 
optional e. g. Approved Software, Validation Techniques, Timeline. But aren't they all 
important? Who decides? Perhaps it is legislation or a general lack of understanding 
of what is technically possible and it is assumed that all methods and techniques are 
applied. 
2.1.3 Legislation 
In modern society the use of information technology (IT) in our lives has become 
evermore pervasive. This has resulted in this technology being used for an increasing 
number of everyday tasks and just as easily for malicious or illegal activity. The 
material obtained from digital technology is usually circumstantial evidence that is 
used to support a case. Evidence of fact is much more difficult to obtain from digital 
devices as without other corroborating information, it is usually very hard to prove 
that a particular suspect was the person who used that device or computer at the time 
the offence was committed. 
Evidence from IT is commonly used to support the prosecution of `traditional' crime 
cases. These are often crimes in which the digital technology was not even invented 
when that legislation was passed. For example, the Criminal Law Act (TSO 1967), 
Homicide Act (TSO 1957) or Offences Against the Person Act (TSO 1861) may be 
used to prosecute a murder. However, it is quite common to examine a suspect's 
computer to try and determine if the suspect had any connection with the victim or if 
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the suspect was trying to research potential ways of committing the crime without 
being detected. 
Another example of traditional legislation being used is the Theft Act (TSO 1968), 
which is to prosecute for theft or `going equipped to steal'. This could involve 
technology if a suspect was found to be carrying a credit card skimmer. This is the 
modern equivalent of being found in possession of lock picking equipment. 
Furthermore, even the development of information technology specific based 
legislation often lags behind the technological advances. This is typified in the UK by 
the Computer Misuse Act (TSO 1990) which was enacted in 1990. This introduced 
offences such as unauthorized access to a computer, unauthorized access to a 
computer with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of further offences 
and unauthorized modification of computer material. This was created prior to the 
proliferation of the World Wide Web and does not easily cover denial of service 
(DoS) attacks. Amendments to this legislation in 2006 in the Police and Justice Bill, 
Part 5, Sections 35 to 38 (TSO 2006) attempt to address this type of anomaly (Section 
36). However, this has raised concerns that it may impede legitimate computer 
security industry practices with regard to handling security vulnerability information 
about malicious programs. 
The way the judiciary keeps legislation more up-to-date and directed to specific 
offences is with the use of case law. For example, when prosecuting an offence of 
`possession' or `distribution' of indecent images, the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) within the UK issued guidance based on a judge's ruling during a case, Rv 
Oliver-Hartrey (EWCA 2002). This gave sentencing guidelines that resulted in the 
production and classification requirements (copine levels) defined in `Practical 
Advice on Investigating Indecent Images of Children on the Internet' (ACPO 2005) 
required when producing evidence that was to be used in this type of case. 
2.2 Overview of the Digital Investigation Process 
Irrespective of the type of investigation being undertaken the process that is 
performed to Preserve, Collect and Examine digital evidence does not change. 
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Furthermore the specific methodology has not changed since computer forensics was 
first undertaken in the 1980s. 
This is best demonstrated with a simple scenario: 
1. A warrant is executed and crime scene attended. 
2. A computer is identified at the scene and a law enforcement officer seizes the 
computer. The officer at the scene puts the computer in a polythene bag and 
secures the bag with a tamper proof seal to which is attached a tag that is duly 
completed with the following information: 
case identifier; 
exhibit identifier - typically the initials of the seizing officer; 
the date and time the computer was seized; 
the location the computer was seized from - e. g the address and location 
within a building; 
a description of the item seized; 
the name of the officer; 
the signature of the officer. 
Also at the scene, an exhibits record would be completed logging all exhibits 
recovered at the address. The record of the computer exhibit would be 
recorded in the exhibits record. 
3. The officer seizing the computer would also be required to produce a witness 
statement which would briefly include the following information: 
Who they were - full name and position / grade or rank; 
A summary of their professional qualifications, knowledge, skills and 
experience; 
A list of the items seized (description) and their exhibit identifier and seal 
number. 
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4. The exhibit would then be transported to a laboratory where the property would be 
booked into the property store. When the item is subsequently withdrawn from the 
evidence store for forensic examination the entry in the property store log would 
be updated to reflect who, when, where and why the exhibit was withdrawn from 
the store. 
5. The examination would typically be conducted by a digital forensic specialist who 
would create a set of case specific contemporaneous notes that record all actions 
and processes undertaken on the exhibit whilst in the control of the examiner. 
These contemporaneous notes and any other unused material can be disclosed to 
the defence by request. 
6. The digital forensic specialist would typically record the following information in 
their contemporaneous notes: 
The exhibit reference number; 
The exhibit seal number; 
The date and time the exhibit came into their possession; 
A photograph may be taken of the exhibit as received; 
The seal on the exhibit would be broken and the contents examined. The 
contents of the exhibit bag would be recorded. 
In this example the make, model and serial number of the computer would be noted 
together with a record of any damage and other details of the exhibit. For a computer 
an external examination would involve recording what connectivity capability or 
visible storage devices the system contained. The topographical layout of the features 
would be noted and usually photographed and removable media devices examined for 
the presence of media. An internal examination would then be conducted; this usually 
involves a certain amount of disassembly of the unit, and again suitable photographs 
showing the layout and configuration of the system would be taken. The internal 
storage media, usually a hard disk drive would be removed and its make, model, serial 
number and capacity noted and photographed. The removed media would then be 
connected to a write protection/blocking device in a laboratory imaging system. The 
write blocking device prevents inadvertent writing to the evidential media. 
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2.2.1 Digital Imaging 
Digital imaging is the cornerstone of the digital forensic process, and has not changed 
since computer forensic investigations were first undertaken some 25 years or so ago 
with tools like Disk Image Backup System (DIBS) or VOGON's imagers Simage, 
LDi, SDi and associated analysis tools. Digital imaging is operating system and filing 
system independent, whereas digital examination and analysis tools discussed in 
section 2.2.2 have to be able to interpret and present the information captured. The 
imaging tools perform a basic but dumb process. The only enhancement made to this 
process has been the addition of hardware write-blocking devices that permit a wide 
and varied range of interfaces to be safely connected to an imaging system. 
An imaging program is used to obtain a full bit level image of the source device; for 
the purposes of imaging discussed in this thesis `bit level' is defined as the lowest 
level of data available to the imaging tool using the standard media interface. Imaging 
is not to be confused with `copying' or `backup' that is usually used to describe the 
capture process of the `live' logical file structure contained on the device. The 
captured image contains all live and unused space. Usually a cryptographic fingerprint 
(hash) is then calculated over the data so that its integrity can be checked and assured 
at a later date. 
All subsequent examination, investigation or restoration of this image is then 
performed after the image is verified as being a true copy by verification of the 
cryptographic fingerprint. There is no consistent approach to bad block handling when 
there is difficulty in reading the source media. Some imagers record the location of 
bad blocks while others ignore them. Similarly, some imagers write a `null' filled 
block to the image when a bad block is encountered while others mark the block with 
an error signature. The method chosen obviously affects the image fingerprint and this 
could lead to difficulties in verifying the outputs of different tools. 
The fingerprint of the captured data should be recorded and a backup of the image file 
should be made; usually to write-once media and produced as the primary evidence 
obtained from the device. Again there is no consistency about where or how the 
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fingerprint is recorded. Some applications append the fingerprint to the end of the 
image data whilst others display the value for the investigator to record manually. 
Ideally a standard approach to imaging would be defined and adopted. However there 
is currently no International Standards body that is trying to achieve this. The 
Common Digital Evidence Storage Format (CDESF) working group of the Digital 
Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) was created in an attempt to tackle this issue 
(CDESF 2006). This resulted in a survey of disk imaging tools, see Appendix B 
(DFRWS 2006). The aim of this study was to identify the common features, 
limitations and tool support that were currently provided for the various formats. 
The predominant formats and imaging tools are now briefly described together with a 
description of the variants of those tools that can be found, and the various metadata 
that may be stored with each. 
2.2.1.1 Raw Imaging Format 
The `raw' format is the most basic format that is used in digital forensics. It comprises 
of a bit level image of the source media and no associated metadata, hence it is the 
most simple to generate and because of this it is the most widely supported. It was not 
conceived as a forensic format but just as a means of storing a full copy of the original 
media. 
Tools and utilities exist on many operating systems in order to obtain a raw image. 
The most popular utility to obtain a raw image is that provided by the Unix `dd' 
command that has been incorporated into Unix for many years. It is a very flexible 
tool that can be used to copy, clone and convert information from various block 
devices. The `dd' utility can also be used in pipes so that its input and output can be 
fed from and to other utilities. 
This flexibility allows `dd' to be used for the forensic acquisition of any block based 
device to a raw image file. Although the utility is very flexible, many forensic 
examiners avoid its use because of the complexity that the flexibility brings. 
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In addition, `dd' does not allow any metadata about the case to be collected at the 
time the acquisition commences. Furthermore, no integrity check (hash) is 
automatically generated and stored by the utility, although a hash can be generated by 
piping the `dd' output through an `md5sum' or similar hash function. When bad 
blocks are encountered using this utility the output image is usually filled with the 
same length of `null' filled data. No provision is made to record the location of the 
bad blocks. 
Variants of the `dd' utility exist (DOD 2007) that automatically store metadata and 
generate integrity hashes, however the outputs from these variants are not widely 
supported or interpreted by other forensic examination and analysis tools. 
The output from the `dd' utility is a plain (raw) bit stream image. This is currently the 
only universal interchange format that all forensic tools and utilities can accept as 
input. 
2.2.1.2 EnCase Imaging 
EnCase is a forensic tool produced by Guidance Software Inc. The functionality 
provided by the EnCase toolset covers the Collection, Examination and Analysis 
phases of the DFRWS framework. 
For the collection or acquisition of digital evidence three applications are available. 
MSDOS (known as EN) and Linux (known as Linen) based utilities allow image files 
(evidence files in EnCase terminology) to be created from source disk media. The 
functionality provided by the MSDOS and Linux versions is identical, therefore only 
the MSDOS version is described in this thesis. The third utility is a Microsoft 
Windows application used to both acquire the evidence and examine its contents. The 
MSDOS and Linux versions are still used on occasions due to the inability of certain 
devices to be accessible within the Microsoft Windows environment. 
2.2.1.2.1 EnCase MSDOS Evidence Acquisition 
When an acquisition is undertaken using this utility the application displays all the 
physical disks and logical volumes that can be found on the attached system and a 
software `lock' is applied to them. The operator has to 'unlock' the target volume that 
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is to be used to store the image files. Use of write blocking devices with the MSDOS 
and Linux variants of the EnCase evidence acquisition tools is optional as these 
operating systems are trusted not to write to the source media. This relies on the user 
not making an error in selecting the output / destination media and applying the 
software lock appropriately. 
Once the evidence and target drives are identified the following information is 
requested from the operator that will be embedded in the header of the image files: 
" Case Number; 
" Examiner [mandatory]; 
" Evidence Number [mandatory]; 
" Unique Description [mandatory]; 
" Current Time [mandatory]; 
" Notes. 
Figure 1 below shows a screen capture of the DOS EnCase acquisition process once 
imaging is commenced. 
Figure 1- DOS EnCase Acquisition screen 1 
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Two modes of disk access are permitted using the MSDOS acquisition method. They 
are 'BIOS' access and `Direct' disk access. The BIOS method uses Intl3 disk access 
calls to read the source media. The Direct ATA method bypasses the BIOS access 
method (Microsoft 2007a) and issues disk ATA commands (ANSI 2005) directly to 
read the source media. The disk access method is important when acquiring hard disk 
drives smaller than 8.5GB in capacity, as it is possible for BIOS access modes to fail 
to `see' the whole hard drive. Typically the size of hard drive reported by the BIOS 
access method would be one cylinder less than the actual number of cylinders on the 
source drive. Both disk access methods correctly report the disk capacity when the 
drive is larger than the 8.5GB limit because in order to access drives over this limit 
Logical Block Addressing (LBA) must be used, whereas below this capacity either 
Cylinder Head Sector (CHS) addressing or LBA addressing could be used. 
Figure 2- DOS EnCase Acquisition screen 2 
2.2.1.2.2 EnCase Windows Evidence Acquisition 
Acquisition on Microsoft Windows operating systems should always be performed 
with the addition of a hardware write blocking device connected between the suspect 
drive and the acquisition system. This is done to prevent Windows accessing and 
changing data and file timestamps on the evidential drive (Microsoft 2007b). 
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The information requested of the examiner (Figure 3) is similar to that of the MSDOS 
acquisition utility: 
" Case Number; 
" Examiner [mandatory]; 
" Evidence Number [mandatory]; 
" Unique Description [mandatory]; 
" Current Time [mandatory]; 
" Notes. 
Figure 3- Windows EnCase Acquisition screen 1 
Other options that can be selected (Figure 4) when acquisition commences are: 
" File Compression Level - None (Fastest, Largest), Good (Slower, Smaller), 
Best (Slowest, Smallest); 
9 Total Sectors to Acquire; 
0 Password - used to restrict access to the image file; 
" Generate Image Hash - selects whether an MD5 hash is calculated and written 
to the footer of the image file at completion of the acquisition; 
0 File Segment Size - selects the output size of each image file. A size is usually 
selected that is convenient for the backup media capacity e. g. CD or DVD. 
Page 18 
EnCue Version 3 
New Q3Upen [L Preview ©AC%ke [' ESrpt 
File Compression Total Sectors to Acquire Password (if any) 
Norge (Fastest, Largest) 39070080 
Good (Slower, Smaller) Confirm Password 
Best (Slowest, Smallest) 
1 Generate image hash (slower) 
Evidence File Path File Segment Size (MB) 
I F: 1, WINDO'WSl, De5ktop\Blooggs PC. EOI 640 
< Back Finish Cancel 
Figure 4- Windows EnCase Acquisition screen 2 
EnCase MSDOS, Linux and Windows imaging tools output an `Evidence File' with 
the same basic format (Bunting 2006). This format is summarised in the following 
diagram (Figure 5). 
111111 
___ ___ ___ VI Case Info. 
Figure 5 
64 Sectors of Data CRC MD5 
- EnCase Evidence File structure 
The full specification of this format is proprietary and has not been released by 
Guidance Software. There are however a number of utilities such as Access Data FTK 
(http: //www. accessdata. com) and Mount Image Pro (http: //www. mountimage. com) 
that can open and interpret the Evidence File format. 
The format records the location of bad blocks to a resolution of 64 sectors and fills the 
corresponding section of the image file with `null' filled data. The problem with this 
approach is that a single bad sector encountered on the source device results in 64 
sectors of null filled image file data. 
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2.2.1.3 Forensic Toolkit (FTK) Imaging 
The Forensic Toolkit (FTK) and FTK Imager are two Windows applications produced 
by Access Data for the forensic acquisition and analysis of digital devices. As its 
name suggests the FTK Imager is the application that is used to acquire evidence from 
physical devices, logical volumes, image files or the contents of a folder. 
The FTK Imager (Figure 6) does not have its own native image file format but is 
capable of acquiring both physical devices and logical volumes into image files of the 
following formats: 
9 Raw (dd) - plain bit stream image format; 
9 SMART (ASR 2002); 
" EO1 - EnCase compatible evidence file format. 
yhw Mode Melp 
02Q? Aýa g. 





512e Type Date Modfled 




Next > Cancel j Heb 
PIUp. t ms 
For Sb. -F1 
Figure 6- FTK Imager Acquisition screen 
2.2.1.4 Digital Imaging Summary 
The previous sections discuss some of the commonly used digital imaging tools and 
highlight a number of inconsistencies in approach and therefore the evidence that 
would be captured. This makes it very difficult to conduct dual tool verification 
without fully understanding how each specific tool operates or handles media errors. 
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This situation is compounded because these basic details are often not published by 
the tool vendors and is left for the practitioner to discover empirically. This 
strengthens the case for standardisation in what is considered the cornerstone of the 
digital forensic process. 
2.2.2 Digital Examination 
Once a successful image has been acquired there are a number of approaches that can 
be adopted in order to examine the contents of the device image. These are: 
1) Restore the image to a clean device to create a clone of the original and boot 
the device on either the same or similar hardware as the original. This used to 
be problematic as the hard disk geometry had to be identical to the original. 
However, since hard disks have increased in capacity (above 8GB) the 
addressing methods used to access them have become simpler (Logical Block 
Addressing (Microsoft 2000)) as opposed to CHS (Cylinder-Head-Sector) 
addressing modes. 
2) Use a digital forensic investigation tool such as Guidance Software Inc. 
EnCase (http: //www. guidancesoftware. com) or Access Data's Forensic 
Toolkit (FTK) (http: //www. accessdata. com). These applications permit a 
forensic image to be viewed and navigated as if through a Windows Explorer 
view with the additional ability to access not only the `live' file structure but 
also the unused and deleted structures on the device. 
3) Boot the image in a virtual machine environment. This uses the technique of a 
virtual machine running on a host operating system. This has the advantage 
that a simulated environment can be created without the time and storage 
overhead of creating a clone. The problem with this approach is that it can 
occasionally be difficult to get the virtual machine hardware to simulate the 
original machine closely enough to create an operational virtual system. 
Examination and investigation is a highly individual process. There is no prescribed 
manual on how to investigate and many good investigators `follow their nose' and 
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develop their own processes and methods as experience increases. Typically. when 
using forensic analysis tools a number of basic processes will always be undertaken in 
a structured order regardless of the type of investigation being conducted. For 
example, it would be common to identify and recover deleted files or folders and also 
determine if the capacity of the logical partition actually filled the capacity of the 
device imaged. If any discrepancies were found then further investigation would need 
to be undertaken. Other basic tasks would also be undertaken; these may include 
performing a hash file analysis to eliminate known good files, identifying the version 
of operating system, the registered owner and any installed applications. 
From then on, the type and objectives of the investigation have to be considered as 
these can determine if keyword searches, email examination, file carving (recovery of 
deleted file types), graphical file examination, document examination or identification 
and decryption of encrypted material etc., is performed. The list of potential tasks to 
undertake is numerous and constantly increasing as new applications, capabilities and 
features are constantly being developed. 
A number of commonly used forensic examination and analysis tools are now briefly 
described to highlight the main features and differences between them. 
2.2.2.1 Guidance Software Inc - EnCase 
At present EnCase is probably the predominant commercial forensic analysis tool 
used by law enforcement. It provides an easy-to-use Windows based application for 
the examination of digital evidence. Its advantage over other tools is its ability to 
interpret a wide range of filing system formats; these include FAT (12,16,32), NTFS, 
EXT2, EXT3, HFS. 
EnCase only supports EnCase evidence file format (EO 1) and raw image file formats. 
The interface provided is a Windows Explorer style system. It allows the examiner to 
navigate the live and recovered files and view file contents in text, hexadecimal or 
gallery (picture) modes (Figure 7). File slack (the part of a file between the logical 
and physical end of the file) is easily identifiable in red. 
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Figure 7- EnCase analysis tool - screenshot 
EnCase allows the examiner to search the evidence files for keywords (either case 
sensitive and / or Unicode) or GREP search patterns. It does this by searching the 
entire contents or selected files in a sequential manner. Therefore some searches can 
take a very long time to complete depending upon the volume of information selected. 
EnCase allows a `hash file analysis' to be performed. This is the identification of 
known and unknown files by comparing the case contents with that of a hash set 
comprised of certified known files. EnCase only supports hash sets based on the MD5 
(IETF 1992) message digest algorithm. 
A library of known hashes is available from the National Software Reference Library 
(NSRL) (http: //www. nsrl. nist. gov) which is maintained by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). The NSRL database is a compilation of over 28 
million unique file hashes containing MD5, SHA-1 and CRC signatures. Other 
cryptographic hash algorithms are planned to be supported in the future. Due to the 
demonstrated weaknesses of the MD5 algorithm (Wang & Yu 2005), there is a 
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progressive move towards SHA variants in preference to MD5 by the digital forensic 
community. 
Unused disk space (or unallocated space in EnCase terminology) is grouped together 
as a single file. This has the advantage that it is easy to select for the purpose of 
keyword searching and data carving. However, it does obscure from the examiner 
contiguous sequences of unused space. 
A unique feature of EnCase is its inbuilt EnScript scripting language that is a C++ and 
Java hybrid. It allows the examiner to customise how data is searched, extracted and 
carved. This is a very powerful feature which is somewhat compromised by Guidance 
Software constantly changing the programming language between versions of the 
tool. 
2.2.2.2 Forensic Toolkit Suite 
The Forensic Toolkit (FTK) suite of tools is produced by Access Data. It comprises a 
number of applications: 
9 Forensic Toolkit (FTK) - Main Forensic examination and investigation tool 
(Figure 8). This also includes the FTK Imager described in section 2.2.1.3; 
" Password Recovery Toolkit (PRTK) - Utility for the cracking of encryption 
and other security mechanisms of over 50 applications; 
" Registry Viewer -A utility for the examination of Microsoft Windows registry 
files; 
" Distributed Network Attack (DNA) -A utility for distributed password 
cracking that utilises processor idle time to systematically search the key space 
of encrypted files. 
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Figure 8- FTK analysis tool - screenshot 
FTK also allows the examination of the contents of an image file in a Windows 
Explorer style view. FTK supports a number of image file formats e. g. raw, E01,101 
to name but a few. However FTK's evidence examination paradigm is different to that 
of many other tools. When an image file is opened with this toolset it is first indexed 
to build a dictionary of all words identified within the image file and also entropy 
tested to determine the types of all files within the image. This process can take a 
while to complete (depending on capacity of image file loaded) but once performed 
allows the examiner to readily view how many files are in the following categories: 
Documents, Spreadsheets, Databases, Graphics, E-mail Messages, Executables, 
Archives, Folders, Slack/Free Space, Other Known Type, Unknown Type. In addition 
to this the File Status list is displayed that tabulates the following categories: KFF 
(Known File Filter hash set) Alert Files, Bookmarked Items, Bad Extension, 
Encrypted Files, From E-mail, Deleted Files, From Recycle Bin, Duplicate Items, 
OLE Subitems, Flagged Ignore and KFF Ignorable. 
A keyword search within FTK is a very quick operation to perform, as it simply has to 
search the dictionary index and allows keywords to be combined within a user- 
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defined proximity. The index also allows a dictionary of all words found within an 
image file to be exported. This can be readily imported into the sister tool PRTK for 
password cracking of protected and encrypted files. This type of file is easily 
identifiable and exported from a case for this purpose. 
FTK also performs a number of other functions when an image file is loaded. These 
include the automatic opening, indexing and reference of email container files. This 
permits email messages to be browsed and searched without having to go searching 
for the container files in the first instance. FTK also automatically opens and indexes 
compressed archive and storage file types, e. g.. CAB (cabinet files), ZIP (compressed 
archive files), and . ISO (image files). 
FTK supports MD5 (IETF 1992) and SHA-1 (IETF 2001) integrity hash algorithms 
for the identification of known files. Within FTK the support for hash sets is known as 
a KFF (Known File Filter). Importation of the NIST hash sets is also supported. 
2.3 Problems with current methods 
The scenario described in the previous section, demonstrates the basic process that 
would be undertaken from the search and seizure through to the imaging, examination 
and analysis as part of a digital forensic investigation. This basic scenario is useful to 
highlight a number of issues and limitations of the toolsets and methodology 
employed. 
The following observations can be made: 
1) The whole process is very reliant on the diligence of the investigator to keep 
sufficiently detailed notes of actions and processes performed through all phases 
of the investigation: Preservation, Collection, Examination, Analysis through to 
Presentation - see section 2.1.2. This aspect is also common to other forms of 
forensic science and not specific to digital forensics. 
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2) The reliability of the evidence that is obtained is also reliant on the investigator 
being adequately trained and competent to acquire the evidence without 
compromising the original. 
3) Repeatability of the information obtained and processes undertaken throughout 
the examination are difficult to assure, as most tools do not log the actions 
performed on the evidence. Without this detailed logging it is almost impossible 
for an independent examiner to identify where, why or how an aspect of the 
investigation was performed. 
4) When a traditional crime is investigated the methods and processes used should be 
proportionate to the severity of the offence (TSO 2000). In a digital investigation 
the approach and method adopted is rarely proportional to the severity of the 
crime being investigated; the imaging process does not take into account the type 
or objectives of the investigation. For example, when an image of a digital device 
is created the whole of the device is captured regardless of type of investigation, 
as this is seen as the only way to maintain the integrity of the information 
acquired. 
5) The storage capacity of digital media is increasing at a phenomenal rate. This 
increases the time taken to acquire the evidence and therefore also increases the 
overhead required to process, search and backup. 
6) There are no facilities for attaching associated material or metadata to a digital 
investigation. For example, textual notes, photographs, thoughts of the 
investigator, reasons and justification of taking a particular action. The metadata 
that is stored with the image is typically limited to name, place, date and time and 
an integrity checksum. This is often in a format that is proprietary and fixed by the 
facilities offered by the tool vendor. This also means that the formats are used to 
lock-in an investigator to one tool and restrict the use of multiple toolsets over the 
same evidence, thus hindering dual-tool verification. 
7) Recording 'standard' practice and the errors or mistakes made during the course 
of an investigation is vital in order to provide the metrics for reviewing the 
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effectiveness and hence improving how investigations are conducted in the future. 
The types of error can broadly be divided into three categories: 
a. Process - the failure to apply the correct processes and procedures that 
adequately take into account the circumstances of the investigation. This 
presumes the investigator knows what the correct process and procedures 
are and how to apply them; 
b. Tool / Application Error handling - the tools that are used to acquire 
evidence do not correctly handle physical device errors or examination 
tools fail to interpret filing system or file formats correctly. For example, 
when an imager is unable to read the original source device the best that is 
usually done is to record the error location and pad the image file with null 
values; 
c. Human error - mistakes are often made as investigators may be fallible, 
there may be mitigating circumstances or reasons for the mistake. This can 
result in the wrong processes, procedures or the application of the wrong 
tools and techniques that may then give unreliable results or outcomes. 
The lessons learned from noting `standard' practice and recording errors can be 
used to train new investigators and improve process, procedures and tools in the 
future if adequate facilities are provided to record, audit and review how 
investigations are undertaken. In a digital investigation the diligence of the 
investigator is relied upon to record the sequence of actions taken on the digital 
evidence. 
8) The technological rate of change is very quick and as a result the forensic tools 
also have to be developed rapidly. This often compromises the amount of testing 
that is performed on a given tool before it is released for use. The reliance is often 
placed on the investigator to test the tools before use. More recently organizations 
like NIST have conducted a basic Computer Forensic Tool Testing programme 
http: //www. cftt. nist. goN-. However, these can only test a small subset of the core 
functionality provided by the most complex tools. 
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9) With the exception of the raw file format that is supported by all forensic tools but 
contains no provision for integrity or metadata, most formats are proprietary to a 
specific vendor. This means that evidence interchange between vendors' tools 
often requires extensive conversion techniques (usually back to a raw format) thus 
incurring what can be an excessive overhead in terms of processing time, integrity 
checking and storage media for no evidential gain and hinders dual-tool 
verification. 
10) Digital forensics evidence capture is usually a static approach in a very controlled 
environment. This process totally disregards the requirement to acquire material in 
a forensically sound manner from a dynamic `live' environment. Often the live 
environment is handled using standard system administration tools and utilities at 
a time when the forensic investigator may already be stressed due to the 
circumstances of the environment and immediacy of the incident being examined. 
This can often lead to irrational and reflex actions, and may cause poor note 
taking and hence a lack of continuity and repeatability of evidence capture. 
11) When digital evidence is processed, the entire image file has to be available and 
loaded into the examination tool. There are currently no examination tools that 
allow multiple investigators to concurrently conduct an examination of a single 
instance of the evidence without the overhead of creating additional copies. 
Similarly there are no tools that allow multiple processors in a distributed 
environment to process evidence. The closest system to this is the Access Data's 
DNA tool that is used to brute-force a limited number of cryptographic 
applications. 
12) Current forensic toolsets provide no features to track evidence continuity and log 
when an application is used to access the evidence. 
1 3) Current forensic toolsets provide few facilities to trace what processes or 
procedures have accessed the evidence, what functions were performed or what 
results were obtained. This functionality is usually limited to the addition of a 
bookmarked item with a short textual comment. 
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14) All tools rely on the whole of the captured evidence being made available to the 
analysis tool before examination can commence. 
15) No current tools allow the objectives or type of investigation to be taken into 
account when collecting or acquiring the evidence. The investigator does this 
when the examination of the evidence is undertaken. 
2.4 Imaging and Analysis Tool Requirements 
The problems identified with current methods, and the observations made in the 
previous section highlight a number of issues and shortcomings with current 
processes, tools and difficulties encountered due to technological advancement. It also 
shows that even though the technology and the capability of IT systems have been 
evolving, the digital forensic process has been relatively static, relying on physical 
measures to fulfill the needs of different jurisdictional evidential processes. 
However, an underlying set of requirements have been identified that should be 
incorporated into current digital forensic imaging and analysis toolsets that 
complement and enhance the physical measures employed. They are: 
1) To provide a mechanism to verify that the data presented at court is identical to 
that acquired from the original media, this may allow detection of errors or 
corruption or provide a mechanism to prevent deliberate unauthorised 
modification; 
2) To record an audit trail of when, where, what or who made: 
a. Assumptions; 




used to Preserve. Collect, and Examine the digital evidence. This should 
be in sufficient detail to permit repeatable and independent verification of 
examination results and findings. It can therefore be used to highlight 
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problems and errors in processes, methods, tools and judgment thereby 
permitting it to be used for training purposes and aid certification; 
3) The mechanisms should be able to be tailored and proportionate to the 
investigation being undertaken; 
4) To provide a mechanism to store evidence as efficiently as possible to improve 
processing, searching and backup; 
5) To provide a means of storing associated information and metadata; 
6) The storage format should be open and well defined; 
7) The storage format should accommodate multiple investigators and systems to 
simultaneously access the evidential information; 
8) The storage format should be able to accommodate information obtained from a 
disparate range of source devices within static and dynamic environments. 
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The requirements listed above can be correlated with the problems discussed in 
section 2.3. There is not a direct singular mapping as some problems may result in 
multiple requirements, Table 1 summarises this correlation. 
Identified Problems - summary Requirements - summary descriptions 
descriptions described in section 2.3 described in section 2.4 
1) Reliance on diligence of investigator to 1) Record provenance. 
keep notes. 
1) Reliance on diligence of investigator to 2) Record continuity. 
keep notes. 
12) Current tools do not record access to 
evidence. 
13) Current tools do not record process or 
function applied to evidence. 
8) Lack of tool testing. 1) Maintain integrity. 
9) Proprietary evidence format. 
1) Reliance on diligence of investigator to 2) & 5) Record audit trail of process / 
keep notes. assumptions / through processes / 
3) Lack of logging. application used / actions / functions / 
6) Inability to store associated meta-data. errors. 
7) Not noting errors or mistakes. 
12) Current tools do not record access to 
evidence. 
13) Current tools do not record process or 
function applied to evidence. 
3) Lack of logging. 1) Reliability & 2) Repeatability. 
7) Not noting errors or mistakes. 
8) Lack of tool testing. 
4) Not taking account of type of offence 3) Proportionate. 
being investigated. 
14) Entire evidence capture before 
commencement of examination. 
15) Not taking account of objectives of 
investigation. 
2) Competency of investigator. 2) Training / Education aid. 
5) Rapid increase in volume of 4) Efficiency - processing / searching / 
information. backup. 
14) Entire evidence capture before 
commencement of examination. 
8) Lack of tool testing. 2) & 6) Tool certification / testing. 
11) Current tools only permit single 7) Multi-investigator support. 
investigator examination. 
10) Traditional digital forensics 8) Support for disparate range of digital 
techniques operate only on static data. devices and environments. 
Table 1- Digital Forensics Issues & Requirements Correlation 
Page 32 
2.5 Scope of Thesis 
The author has many years experience working in the field of digital investigations 
and it is considered worthwhile re-examining the processes that are the cornerstone of 
digital forensic investigations. The aim of this study is to address the issues and 
problems identified in section 2.3 and propose a solution that is capable of fulfilling 
the requirements defined in section 2.4. The solution will be primarily directed 
towards the acquisition (imaging) and subsequent examination of computer based 
media, as this is the area of digital forensics that is currently most widely understood. 
Specifically, if additional audit and continuity features can be supported then the 
absolute reliance on the diligence of the investigator can be reduced so that they are 
more able to focus upon the investigation rather than the procedural methodological 
record taking. This reduces the possibility that cases could be dismissed on procedural 
technicalities and is also an aspect that should be able to be implemented in modern 
systems without significant overheads. Additionally, the verification of results or the 
ability to determine if inconsistency is due to an analysis application error is just as 
important. 
Also, the ability to provide a proportional approach to the capture of evidence is 
addressed, because with the ever increasing media storage capacities it may not be 
efficient or economical to always capture everything. 
Current forensic tools operate in either a live (dynamic) environment or static 
environment. A framework that is able to accommodate both of these scenarios 
should enable common and more efficient analysis tools to be created as the type of 
functions that are required to be performed on evidence captured from both 
environments are identical; for example, keyword searches, dictionary creation, 
information extraction or timeline analysis. 
Ideally an extensible solution should be able to accommodate current technology and 
cater for future developments in storage capacity and alternate digital devices as they 
are developed and become prevalent in society. 
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3 Digital Evidence Bags (DEB) 
3.1 Traditional Evidence Storage - Bags, Tags and Seals 
The tried and trusted method for containing and storing physical material that may be 
used evidentially is the evidence bag. Although there are no international standards 
for physical evidence bags, they all serve two purposes: 
1. To securely contain the object so that it can be detected if it has been accessed 
or tampered with; 
2. To provide a vehicle to record the provenance and continuity of its contents 
until such time as it may be used in a court or tribunal. 
There are a number of common sizes of bag produced, but the actual size used is at 
the discretion of the seizing official and would be chosen depending upon the size of 
the article that it has to contain. The type of bag used would also be selected 
depending upon the type of material that it has to contain and is manufactured from 
either a transparent or opaque material. The reason for using an opaque container 
would be if the material seized should not be viewable until it was examined 
officially. For example, if potential legally professional privileged (LPP) documents 
were seized that may contain sensitive or restricted material, which may be relevant to 
other legal cases; this should only be viewed for the purpose of the particular case 
under investigation. Other evidential material such as a desktop computer may be 
stored in a transparent bag as there is no compromise of the material or chance of 
viewing sensitive information until the system is removed for examination. 
The following picture (Figure 9) shows a typical transparent evidence bag with 
integrated tag. An evidence tag stores key information regarding who, where, when 
and a brief description of what evidence was seized. The tag is used by the 
investigating officer to record details about the material collected and should be 
completed at the time of seizure. The following information can be recorded: 
" Exhibit identifier - the exact format of this may vary according to local 
convention. The following are commonly used: 
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o The seizing officers initials followed by a reference number e. g. 
PBT/l; 
o The day, month, year and then the seizing officers initials and 
reference number e. g. 24112007/PBT/ 1; 
o The laboratory case reference number followed by the seizing officers 
initials and reference number e. g. ABC/123/PBT/1; 
" Brief description of item/contents; 
" Where, when and by whom the item was seized; 
"A signature of the seizing official; 
" An area to record the details of where, when and who took custody of the item 
after the item was seized. This is used to provide continuity of the evidence 
from time of seizure until used as evidence, restored to the owner or 
destroyed. 
"A tamper-proof seal and `pseudo' unique number. The seal number format is 
specific to a manufacturer. However it is possible to have identical seal 
numbers although the chance of these being used in the same case is minimal. 
Figure 9- Transparent evidence bag label 
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The following pictures show a tag (Figure 10) that would be used in conjunction with 
bags without an integrated tag and tamper-proof seal (Figure 11 and Figure 12). 
Figure 10 - Evidence tag 
Figure 11 - Tamper proof seal -1 
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Figure 12 - Tamper proof seal -2 
The concept of bags, tags and seals is universally accepted, and understood by all 
jurisdictions, law enforcement personnel, legal professionals and to a lesser extent the 
general public. All digital evidential materials rely upon the physical evidence 
handling and storage methods to restrict access to the physical storage media. 
3.1.1 Characteristics of Bags, Tags and Seals 
In summary the following characteristics of Bags, Tags and Seals used in traditional 
evidence storage and handling are: 
" Bags are universal containers used to store many different types and quantities 
of physical evidence. They may be opaque or transparent depending upon the 
type of material to be stored; 
" Tags provide a mechanism to record provenance and track continuity of the 
evidential material contained in the bag; 
" Seals provide a mechanism to detect the unauthorised access to the evidential 
material contained in the bag. 
3.2 DEB Concept 
As discussed in the previous chapter the format of files used for the storage of digital 
evidence is not standardised, and usually only record limited provenance information. 
The Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) addresses these shortcomings of the digital formats 
currently in use by emulating the characteristics of the physical bags described in 
section 3.1.1. This is done because the judiciary and law enforcement understand and 
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accept the use of physical evidence bags, however within the digital world additional 
features can be implemented to further enhance evidence integrity assurance, record 
provenance and track continuity. 
A DEB is a universal extensible container for the storage of digital information 
acquired from any digital source (Turner 2005b), the format of which can be 
manipulated to meet the requirements of the particular information that is to be stored. 
The format definition is extensible thereby allowing it to encompass new 
cryptographic and compression algorithms and protocols as developed in the future, 
whilst also providing the flexibility for some degree of backwards compatibility as the 
format develops. 
The basic structure of a DEB is shown in Figure 13 and comprises of three 
components - Tag, Index and Bag. The terminology used to describe the main 
components was chosen to replicate that used for traditional evidence handling for 
ease of understanding and clarity of purpose. This shows a hierarchy of components 
of which the tag is used as the primary container recording Evidence Unit content 
descriptions, evidential integrity and continuity records. An Evidence Unit (EU) is a 
pair of components (Index and Bag) that contain any arbitrary evidential data in the 
bag and a tabular list of the bag contents in the index. This structure was chosen 
because of its flexibility, simplicity, comprehensibility and scalability. 
A DEB and most other digital forensic storage formats provide evidential integrity 
assurance mechanisms that are stronger than the seal numbers used for physical 
evidence, usually in the form of a cryptographic digest or hash. However, these only 
allow for the detection of accidental or media corruption changes. The DEB concept 
could improve upon this by storing in one EU the necessary information required for 
evidence error correction or even repair. 
A 'DEB aware' application is a forensic tool that is capable of parsing the tag to 
identify and access Evidence Units (EUs) applicable to the function of the utility, and 
maintains the evidence continuity audit trail by updating the tag appropriately. In 
order to be able to maintain the integrity, continuity and auditing facilities that the 
DEB framework provides, a 'DEB aware' application should implement a standard 
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API that controls the creation and access of the various DEB components. A standard 
API provides the additional advantage that forensic applications can be more easily 
tested and verified. 
3.3 DEB Components 
The following lists the DEB components that are created as part of the creation and 
capture process, hence for a single evidence capture three components are created 
(Figure 13): - 
" Tag; 
" Index nn - where `nn' is a reference number/count; 










Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) 
Index nn 
Bag nn 
Figure 13 - Digital Evidence Bag basic structure 
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3.3.1 DEB Tag 
The Tag component of a DEB comprises of four main information sections (Figure 
14): 
" DEB Header; 
" Evidence Unit (EU) index number and content reference; 
" DEB Footer; 
" Tag Continuity Blocks (TCBs). 
The Tag is a dynamic component of a DEB. When a DEB is created the Header to 
Footer sections are recorded sequentially, with the Footer being written on 
termination of the DEB creation/evidence capture application. All subsequent 
applications that access any contents of the DEB are recorded in TCBs. 
Figure 14 -Tag structure 
3.3.1.1 DEB Header Information Section 
The DEB header contains information such as investigating officer, timestamp of 
when the DEB was created, and description of what, where and when evidence was 
captured. Within the DEB header the `Index Format' entry specifies the default 
content sequence of the DEB's Index components; it may also be specified per EU. 
The index format is defined by a sequence of meta-tags. This allows each EU to be 
customisable within the DEB thus enabling a DEB to store information from a wide 
range of devices. 
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DEB Header EU Index Number and DEB TCBs 
Content Reference. Footer 
The information recorded in the DEB Header is analogous to that recorded on an 
evidence tag when a physical item of evidence is seized, see Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
The tag contains the following information: 
" DEB unique reference identifier; 
" details of the evidence contained in the DEB in a machine parseable form; 
" the name and organisation of person capturing the information; 
" the date and time the capture process started; 
"a list of Evidence Units (EUs) contained in the DEB. An EU is the name given 
to an Index and its corresponding Bag; 
"a hash of the captured information contained in the DEB; 
" tag seal number comprised of a signature/hash of the tag to date, this is 
equivalent to the traditional seal number; 
" Tag Continuity Blocks (TCBs) containing continuity information of when any 
DEB aware application accesses the DEB; 
" the format definition of the Index. 
3.3.1.2 Evidence Unit Information Section 
The Evidence Units section of a DEB tag is used to record all EUs created in the 
DEB. Each EU section contains a content type description, an integrity hash of the 
index and an integrity hash of the bag. 
Evidence Unit 0 is reserved for case notes and case associated metadata at the time of 
DEB creation. It contains information about the imager used to create the DEB, 
including revision number, imager application integrity hash, imager configuration 
file and details of capture selection criteria. Additional case information can be 
included in this EU, such as photographs, free-form text and references to physical 
aspects of the case. 
The content type of other Evidence Units is arbitrary and is determined by the 
examiner based upon the case requirements and / or configuration of the imager or 
acquisition tool and device being acquired. 
Page 41 
3.3.1.3 DEB Footer Information Section 
The DEB Footer section is used to record the number of EUs within the DEB. The 
DEB is then sealed with a tag signature / hash written at the end. This is analogous to 
the signature of the seizing officer on a physical evidence tag. Subsequent access to 
the DEB contents result in a Tag Continuity Block (TCB) being appended to the tag. 
3.3.1.4 Tag Continuity Block Information Section 
DEB aware applications update the tag with a Tag Continuity Block (TCB) to reflect 
the history of operations performed on a particular EU or DEB as a whole. TCBs are 
used to record the open and close operations performed on a particular EU or DEB. 
The information recorded in a TCB includes: 
" the date and time a DEB aware application was used to access an EU or DEB; 
" an application signature / hash; 
" an application description and version number details; 
" an application category description; 
" an updated tag signature / hash. This is a newly generated / calculated value 
covering the revised tag data. 
The TCB information section of the tag contains an expanding set of TCB details. Tag 
continuity sections used for physical evidential items (see Figure 9 and Figure 10) 
typically only record the signature and timestamp of the person taking custody of the 
evidence. In this respect the DEB TCB records more comprehensive information 
regarding the access, function performed and handling of the evidence. 
Ideally the actions performed on a DEB and the transactions recorded within the TCB 
will be performed reliably. To achieve this, the DEB tag is required to have the 
following properties: 
" Atomicity - refers to the DEB API being able to guarantee that either all of the 
tasks of a transaction recorded in a TCB are performed or none of them are, 
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" Consistency - refers to the DEB tag being in a legal state when the transaction 
begins and when it ends. This involves performing integrity checking of the 
DEB tag and EU components. 
" Isolation - refers to the ability of the DEB application to make operations in a 
transaction appear isolated from all other operations. This would be 
particularly difficult to achieve in a multi-processor or distributed 
environment. 
" Durability - refers to the guarantee that every transaction is recorded and that 
once the user has been notified of success, the transaction will persist, and 
cannot be undone. 
ACID properties are typically defined for distributed systems and transactional 
database manipulation (Coulouris et. al 2000). An API that encompasses these 
properties also fulfils some of the forensic application requirements defined in section 
2.4, Table 2 shows the correlation between ACID properties and the requirements that 
they assist in fulfilling. 
ACID Property Requirement 
Atomicity Maintain Integrity 
Consistency Maintain Integrity 
Repeatability/ Reliability 
Record Audit Trail 
Isolation Maintain Integrity 
Multi-investigator Support 
Durability Maintain Integrity 
Table 2- ACID Properties & Requirements Correlation 
The ACID properties are highly desirable, the degree to which these are achieved in 
any particular DEB implementation affect the environment (single or multi-user and 
single or distributed processing system) in which it is deployed and thus the flexibility 
and usability available to the digital forensic investigator. The TCB provides the basic 
mechanisms required of a digital evidence handling and storage system to maintain 
the integrity, record an audit trail and thus a method that should be repeatable and 
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reliable. The specific implementation details required to implement the ACID 
properties within the DEB context are not considered further in this thesis and is an 
area which should be undertaken in future DEB API development. 
3.3.2 DEB Index 
The index details the contents of the corresponding bag. The index may contain 
details such as a list of file names, folder paths, and timestamp information relating to 
the contents of the digital information in the bag. Alternatively it may contain details 
of the physical device, for example the make, model and serial number of the device 
seized or device from which the digital evidence was obtained. The exact contents and 
format of this component varies depending upon the content type of the EU. Its 
format is specified in the Index Format definition in the tag and is comprised of a 
series of Meta-Tag labels that define its contents. 
3.3.3 DEB Bag 
The bag component contains the actual evidence captured. The contents of this bag 
may be either raw binary information (e. g. from raw device capture), files (e. g from 
logical volume acquisition), structured text (e. g. from network packet capture) or 
categorized files (e. g. one bag containing all text files, another containing all MS 
word docs, another containing all JPEG graphics files etc. ). Additionally, a bag could 
contain another DEB. 
3.4 DEB Characteristics 
3.4.1 Provenance 
One of the most important requirements for traditional evidence handling is to be able 
to record the provenance (section 3.1.1) and track continuity of evidence from time of 
seizure until used as evidence in court, and for a period of time after the case has been 
heard, for some offences this can be up to 30 years under UK law. Although this is 
one of the prime requirements no formal definitions as to how this should be applied 
to digital evidence exist. To clarify this, the author has given consideration into the 
definition of a number of attributes which together constitute evidence reliability 
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(Turner 2005) (Turner 2007a) -a copy of which may be found in Appendix A. These 
attributes of `good' provenance are defined as: 
" Unique - the provenance of a piece of evidence shall resolve to a single instance 
of that evidence. There may well be multiple copies of an identical file on a 
system but the provenance of each shall be unique, therefore it is possible to have 
multiple identifiers for a single instance or entity. 
" Unambiguous - the provenance of a piece of evidence shall not be open to 
misinterpretation. 
9 Concise - the provenance of a piece of evidence shall be succinct and clear. This 
may not always be possible if using a logical location that may have been defined 
by the user of a system. 
9 Repeatable - the provenance of a piece of evidence shall be simple to replicate 
thus confirming the evidence provenance. This should be true independent of the 
forensic tools used during the investigation. 
" Comprehensible - The description used to represent the provenance of a piece of 
information shall be simple and be easy to understand in a human interpretable 
form. This is a particularly important characteristic when provenance is to be 
described in a court that may consist of non-technical people - the intended 
audience should always be taken into consideration. 
A DEB records the provenance of the information stored within it, this could be 
acquired from a number of disparate sources, for example, a physical device or logical 
file. This raises a number of issues, especially if we are aiming to record information 
that complies with the attributes of `good' provenance. For example if we store a file, 
what information should be recorded to define its origin? 
When a user of a system saves a file to a hard disk then it is common to not only give 
the file a meaningful name. but also to store it in a folder (directory) where it can 
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easily be referenced and retrieved in the future. In addition to the file and folder name 
the user often knows the drive name/letter to which the file is saved. The drive is 
often referenced in the Microsoft environment by its drive letter. For example a user 
may know that a local hard disk is assigned the letter `C' or the network drive may 
have an assigned drive letter of `N'. Obviously this varies system by system and the 
user becomes accustomed to whatever drive letter is used on their system. 
The assignment of that drive letter may be automatically allocated by the operating 
system. For example, if the system has a Microsoft Windows 98 operating system 
installed then the drive letter assignment is usually done by the order, type and 
number of partitions that are found within the partition table of the hard disk 
(Microsoft 2004). With Unix or more recent Microsoft operating systems the drive 
letter allocation may be slightly different (Microsoft 2003) and may even be 
configured by the user (Microsoft 2007c). 
From the user's perspective, the drive letter followed by folder path and file name in 
the following form 'C: \My Documents\Hello. doc', is how the user routinely 
references their information. However, in the digital forensic world this often gets 
more complicated, but when presenting file provenance information to a court it is 
worth bearing in mind this is what the majority of computer users are familiar with. 
The drive letter followed by folder path and file name, to the digital forensic 
specialist, are a logical description of the file location. Although it provides a unique 
(relative to the state of the system at that time), unambiguous and concise descriptor 
for the provenance from a non-technical users perspective, there are also other 
descriptors that may be used, for example the logical cluster numbers that the file 
occupies. This more technical definition records more information than the logical 
path and file name as it could also show if the file was fragmented in any way. This 
may be a significant piece of information that would be lost if only one form of 
provenance were recorded. Further, another unique, unambiguous and even more 
concise descriptor could be used, the physical sector locations that the file occupies 
could be recorded. 
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This leads to the questions; Which of these is best? Does it matter? Does one method 
mean the evidence is `better' or has more integrity than another? Should we just 
record as many provenance descriptions as possible? It can be argued that in its own 
way each method meets the `good' provenance criteria. It just depends upon the 
technical knowledge of the person trying to understand it. For example the general 
public, judge or legal professional is likely to be more familiar with a folder location 
than a more technical absolute disk sector or cluster reference. These other `more 
technical' provenance descriptions may only complicate matters by introducing more 
technical vocabulary that actually detracts from and obscures the real information to 
be presented. In an ideal world we would record all provenance descriptions. 
This would lead to multiple provenance definitions (keys) that can be used to sort, 
reference and catalogue information. The following example shows the keys for hard 
disk based information but the same principal could equally be applied to digital 
information obtained from other devices: 
" Primary Provenential Key = Physical sector locations; 
" Secondary Provenential Key = Logical cluster locations within a volume with the 
addition of an offset from the beginning of the physical device; 
" Tertiary Provenential Key = Folder location specified from the root folder. 
A DEB is capable of recording multiple provenance descriptions for a single entity 
stored in the bag file. These descriptions are stored in the index file and can be used to 
aid sorting and searching for information within the DEB or EU. The sequence in 
which the provenance descriptions are stored within the index file implies the key 
order (Primary -> Secondary -> Tertiary -> ... 
). 
Mapping between different provenential keys is possible but only with additional 
information. For example, conversion from a physical sector number to logical cluster 
number requires partition offset and the number of sectors per cluster count. 
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3.4.2 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality although important in an evidentiary context is usually not of primary 
concern as strict physical controls are usually in place to restrict who has access to the 
material. Thus access would usually only be available to personnel who have the 
necessary clearances and authorisation. Additionally, once evidence is placed in an 
evidence bag and sealed then casual access is denied without breaking the seal. 
The DEB structure can be used to protect the information contained within the bag 
file from unauthorised or casual access. This is accomplished by obfuscating the 
contents by either compressing or encrypting the contents of the bag. This is 
analogous to protecting evidence in the physical world by the use of opaque evidence 
bags so that the contents cannot be seen until it is opened. 
The protection that can be placed around digital evidence using cryptographic 
methods can be stronger than traditional evidence security. This would however 
require the implementation of key management mechanisms and policies for the issue 
and distribution of key material. As previously stated, evidence may have to kept for 
up to 30 years, this is a significant factor that has to be considered for not only the 
long term management of key material but also the effectiveness of encryption 
mechanism used. 
3.4.3 Integrity 
Integrity is the main security concern for digital evidence together with the ability to 
be able to prove that the information contained within the bag has not changed since it 
was seized (see requirements section 2.4 and 3.1.1). This is an area in which digital 
evidence differs from wet forensic sciences such as DNA and chemical analysis as 
these require that part of the original sample be used to conduct the analysis. These 
procedures must not contaminate the remaining original sample, however the original 
sample may have reduced volume. Alternatively, the properties of materials examined 
using these techniques may decay over time. 
In the digital environment it could be quite trivial to modify a number of bytes of 
information in a manner that would be undetectable. Further. it is common for digital 
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storage media to deteriorate over a period of time. For example, the stability of 
information written to CD/DVD substrate material is known to have a limited shelf 
life (OSTA 2003). Even hard disk technology can be unreliable over a number of 
years but that could be due to physical attribute conditions such as hard disk bearing 
seizure, heads sticking to the platters or unsuitable environmental conditions 
(temperature and humidity). These are the main factors that have to be guarded 
against with regards to digital evidence integrity. The methods used are tried and 
trusted and involve the use of Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC) and cryptographic 
one-way hashes or a combination of the two. The DEB framework provides integrity 
assurance of the data contained within the bag file and additionally uses the same 
method to assure the integrity of the bag and index file components of the DEB. The 
integrity check values are generated by DEB aware applications at the time of DEB 
population. These methods do not preclude subsequent unauthorised modification of 
the data contained within the DEB by unscrupulous personnel, but does allow 
detection should accidental corruption occur. To prevent unauthorised modification a 
public key encryption scheme could be used, the details of how such a scheme would 
be incorporated into the DEB framework is an area for further work. The current DEB 
framework also assumes that the device is able to be read correctly without error. 
Additionally the DEB framework when used with DEB aware and compliant 
applications can provide greater integrity assurance of evidence and results obtained 
due to the integral audit processes (see sections 3.4.5 and 3.4.6). 
3.4.4 Availability 
To analyse captured digital information the forensic analysis tool usually requires that 
the whole of the captured data be made available to the tool in order for analysis to 
commence. Therefore, this potentially imposes a number of limitations: 
1) Sufficient fast access storage capacity is required to contain the whole image 
and also the data extracted from it, if the image is shared over a network, 
access time may be impaired; 
ý) Typically. only one system `box' (shared memory processor) can be used to 
process the image at a time. 
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In order to mitigate these issues the DEB framework permits the distribution of EU 
component files in a structured manner; thus improving access performance and 
availability and also allowing a distributed or multi-processor environment to be 
utilised. 
Similarly, multiple (disparate) forensic applications, each performing a different 
function, could operate on separate EUs. This allows the most appropriate analysis 
techniques to be applied to the information. For example, a keyword search to 
document files and graphical analysis techniques to picture/image files. 
3.4.5 Continuity 
Once evidence has been seized and its provenance recorded, it is exceedingly 
important to be able to track the continuity of who, where and when other persons 
took possession and held custody of the evidential material. This is accomplished in 
the traditional physical evidence handling environment by paper based property store 
records that record property movements. This is referenced using tags attached to the 
bags or containers that encapsulate the evidential material (see requirements of 
traditional evidence handling - section 3.1). 
Should anyone wish to examine or perform analysis on the evidential material then 
the tamperproof seal has to be broken. This should be recorded in case notes and 
property store records, and once examination is complete then the evidence has to be 
resealed in another tamperproof container and its new seal number duly recorded. 
Typically if the physical seal has to be broken or the bag cut then the seal or bag 
would be placed within the new container thereby providing the audit trail of all 
custodians and containers that were used to hold the evidence. 
DEBs have the ability to record continuity information in the tag file by the use of 
Tag Continuity Blocks (TCB). These are similar in nature to the continuity sections 




Current forensic applications allow the examiner to record and highlight (bookmark) 
relevant information but do not record the process that was undertaken during the 
investigation or provide any facilities to record the thought processes and justification 
for any actions taken by the examiner. 
The DEB framework provides the ability to log the processes undertaken and the 
facility to record any notes or associated data the investigator deems necessary. This 
provides the necessary audit trail for other examiners to retrace the steps that were 
performed. This is quite a significant feature as it allows the development of optimal 
methods for case processing and provides the tools to identify if errors in process or 
procedure occurred. The process information is recorded in the DEB in a separate 
case note EU that is dedicated to the storage of process and contemporaneous notes. 
TCBs complement the process recording mechanism in case note EUs as they record 
application signatures and when accesses to the DEB contents were made. 
A Digital Investigation Process Language (DIPL) was defined in (Stephenson 2003) 
and (Stephenson 2004) as a means to formally define and understand the processes 
undertaken as part of an investigation. DIPL is a LISP based language used to define 
the sequence of processes and actions undertaken as part of an investigation. A DIPL 
document of an investigation could be stored in a DEB. 
3.4.7 Time 
When conducting digital forensic examinations it is important to record the time when 
an event occurred for a number of reasons (see requirements defined in section 2.4): 
1) to be able to ascertain the validity of evidence being examined; 
2) as a point of reference when examining evidence; 
timelining or event sequencing/ordering. 
When evidence is seized it is common for the investigating officer to log the date and 
time on the tag attached to the material seized. It is common practice to use the time 
source that is currently to hand, as accuracy to within a minute or so is usually 
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adequate, however in a digital environment the resolution and accuracy of a 
timestamp may be crucial in correlating and corroborating information. 
The recording of when particular events occurred in a digital environment is a 
function that most applications and systems perform automatically (Farmer & 
Venema 2005). The timestamp information is usually based upon the device's real- 
time clock or obtained from a network or radio time source. The resolution of these 
time sources may be a millisecond or less, but the accuracy of the time source is 
usually not important until there is a need to correlate information. 
This seeming harmless discrepancy can cause major problems when correlating 
information from disparate sources or across different time zones, not withstanding 
the additional confusion that can be caused with daylight saving adjustments. There 
are a number of different time formats (IETF 2002), (WETSTONE 2007), that are 
encountered in digital environments which can lead to correlation difficulties due to 
the variability of resolution, accuracy of source and the fact that different epochs may 
be used. 
The DEB framework stores date and time in UTC format. The source of the 
timestamp can be the real-time clock of the host system or some other trusted and 
verified source such as radio clock or network time service. It is good practice on 
behalf of the investigator to verify and record accurate time and time zone 
information when the investigation commences. The DEB framework supports this 
concept by permitting timestamp details to be recorded when the DEB is created and 
accessed by DEB aware applications. This enhances the provenance and continuity 
audit trails, thus providing confidence that the evidence was not changed or tampered 
with. 
3.5 DEB Syntax Definition 
This section defines the syntax used to implement a DEB based on the abstract 
components in section 3.3. The language used in this section shall be interpreted in 
accordance with RFC 2119 - `Keywords in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels' 
(IETF 199, '). 
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Figure 15 - Detailed DEB diagram 
3.5.1 Tag File - General Information 
The tag file is a plain text file containing the details of the evidence contained within 
the DEB. The information contained in this file is similar to that of a physical tag 
attached to evidence when it is seized. 
Therefore it contains the following basic details: 
" An evidence identifier or reference; 
" The name of the person capturing the information; 
" The date and time when the capture process started; 
"A description of the contents of the DEB; 
" Continuity information. 
Some of these attributes are self explanatory in their meaning and content, but in the 
digital environment there is more scope to record information about the evidence and 
maintain its integrity. 
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One of the most important features of a tag is that it is used to record the provenance 
of information and provide continuity of the information contained within the bag. In 
a DEB environment it is also used in this context, but its scope is expanded in that it 
can be used to show when a DEB analysis application has used the DEB and what 
function has been performed on any EU in the DEB. 
Also included in the tag file is a count of the number of EUs (. Inn and Bnn file pairs) 
in the DEB, an integrity hash of the captured data and a Tag seal hash. This is 
equivalent to the traditional seal number and signature of the seizing officer. 
A Tag Continuity Block (TCB) is appended to the file every time an application 
performs an action on the DEB as a whole, or part of a particular EU. This records the 
date, time, version, application signature (hash) and function of the application that 
has been used on the DEB. Ideally the DEB access process will have ACID properties 
as discussed in section 3.3.1.4. 
In addition to this the DEB application will generate a new Tag seal hash that is 
calculated over the contents of the Tag file including the new TCB information. 
One important component that gives the DEB the flexibility to hold information 
captured from a variety of sources (i. e. static, real-time, and selective) is the Meta-Tag 
structure used within the DEB header. 
In certain circumstances it may be an advantage to compress or encrypt the contents 
of either a whole DEB or part (EU). This is done by specifying a content format type. 
Evidence Unit fragments are also permitted to allow full device acquisition and each 
EU fragment to fit onto a backup media. 
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3.5.1.1 DEB Header 
The DEB tag file shall start with the following entry: 
[DEB Header vM. N] 
Where M is the major version number and N is the minor version number. This allows 
an application parsing the DEB tag file to identify which DEB definition the file 
complies with. 
Following the [DEB Header vM. N] line, additional information regarding the 
affiliation of the investigating officer and exhibit details shall be recorded. If any of 
the entries are not required then the line header shall be included with no following 
detail information: 
[DEB Header vO. 82] 
Investigating Agency : <Organisation Name - mandatory> 
Investigating Officer : <Investigator Name - mandatory> 
Exhibit : <Exhibit Reference Number - mandatory> 
Description : <Textual Description - mandatory> 
Location : <Textual Description - mandatory> 
Case Reference : <Case Reference Number - mandatory> 
DEB Created Date & Time : <Timestamp - mandatory> 
Host ID : <Host Identifier Description on which DEB is created e. g 
Host name, IP Address - optional> 
Password : <Device or host Password/PIN/Passphrase on which DEB is 
created - optional> 
3.5.1.2 Meta-Tags (MTs) - Index Format 
In order to define the contents and format of the Index file the structure is defined in 
the Tag file. The structure definition is comprised of a series of Meta-Tags (MTs). 
The MTs are used to define both the sequence of fields and content type of the Index 
file. 
In order to specify the format of an Index file the Tag file shall include the line: 
Index Format : <Meta-Tags> 
Page 55 
This should be the last line in the [DEB Header vM. N] section of the file if used for 
the whole DEB. An Index Format may also be specified for each EU. 
The sequence that Meta-Tags appear in the Index Format entry is the order of the 
provenential keys. For example, the Primary provenential key is the first meta-tag, the 
Secondary provenential key is the second meta-tag and the Tertiary provenential key 
is the third meta-tag. 
The index file holds information relating to the contents of the bag file. 
3.5.1.3 Meta-Tag Definitions 
<PS> = Physical Sector Number - contiguous runs of sectors, bytes per sector: nnn- 
nnn, nnn-nnn,.. . 
<LCN> = Logical Cluster Number - contiguous runs of clusters, offset: sectors per 
cluster, nnn-nnn, nnn-nnn,.. . 
<C> = command entered into Command Line Interface (CLI) 
<F> = Filename and path 
<Fx> = Filename extension/type 
<Fa> = File Attributes (E. g. System, Read, Archive, Hidden) 
<Fmft> = Master File Table (MFT) Index number 
<Fls> = Logical File Size in bytes 
<Fps> = Physical File Size occupied in bytes 
<P> = Provenential Information 
<Ds> = Data source (PDA) - RAM, ROM, Database (User Data), SIM, Handset 
'11md5> = Hash MD5 
<Hsha> = Hash SHA 
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<Rnum> = DEB Record Number 
<Rlen> = Record Length 
<Tmod> = Timestamp - last modified / completed 
<Tacc> = Timestamp - last accessed 
<Tcre> = Timestamp - created / started / executed 
<Temo> = Timestamp Entry modified (NTFS) 
<Tpacket> = Packet time 
<Ddes> = Device descriptor 
<Dman> = Device manufacturer 
<Dmod> = Device model 
<Dsn> = Device serial number 
<Dcap> = Device capacity 
<Dpin> = Device PIN, security access code, password 
<Dsp> = Device service provider (phone) 
<Raw> = Bag contents are raw/binary no structure 
3.5.1.4 Extending Meta-Tags 
The use of Meta-Tags can also be extended by permitting special `short form' or 
`alias' definitions for commonly used sets of Meta-Tags. This aids in keeping the Tag 
file clutter free and more easily understandable. 
The following examples define special Meta-Tags for FAT and NTFS filing systems. 
It is common for a filing system to have a number of attributes associated with a file. 
The special Meta-Tags provide a mechanism for defining the expansions within a 
DEB Index Format definition. 
<FAT> = F Fx Fa Tmod Tacc Tcre Fls Fps P Hmd5 
<NTFS> =F Fx Fa Tmod Tacc Tcre Temo Fls Fps P Hmd5 
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3.5.1.5 Evidence Units (EUs) 
The Evidence Unit definition shall immediately follow the DEB Header section and 
the Index Format specifiers. 
This section of the Tag file shall commence with the following line: 
[Evidence Units] 
Information specific to each EU shall be defined in the [Evidence Units] section as 
follows: 
EU=nn 
<Format type definition> 
where nn is the EU number 
3.5.1.6 DEB or EU - information format types 
This section defines the format type of information in either the whole DEB or EU 
part. The scope of each of these format types is dependant upon the placement of the 
format type specifier in the DEB. If the type specifier is in the DEB Header then the 
format applies to the whole DEB. If the type specifier is in the EU definition then the 
format applies to only that EU. 
Evidence Unit 0 (EUO) is reserved for the storage of arbitrary case notes and the 
recording of process, see section 3.1.6. This can include text entries or associated 
digital metadata files, for example, documents or photographs etc. 
3.5.1.7 Content Types 
This defines the type of content that is contained in each EU. The definitions in this 
section specify an initial set of types. Further work is required to formalise and 
manage this set and permit the registration of new types. The practicalities of how this 
should be accomplished have not been considered in this work but there is precedence 
such as the definition of MIME types which is controlled by the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) - http: //www. iana. org/. 
Page 58 
In order to specify the content type of the DEB as a whole or a particular Evidence 
Unit (EU) the tag file shall include the line: 
ContentType-Sig=<File Signaturel>, <File Signature2>... 
Or 







<label> - Process List, Users, Network Config, Directory List etc. 
Or 
ContentType=Case Notes - Contents are Case Notes, usually only used 
by Evidence Unit 0 
Or 
ContentType-Format=<format> - Contents are another image file 
format. For example, Raw, EnCase or AFF. 
Or 




ContentType-DEV=<Device Type> - Valid types are Disk, Mobile Phone, 
PDA, Magnetic Swipe Card Reader/Writer (skimmer). 
The <File Signature> shall be in the form \xFF\xFF\xFF... where FF is a series of 
hexadecimal byte values (magic number) at the start of a file. 
The <File Extension> shall be the file extension or suffix used as part of the filename. 
<Category Type> e. g. Documents, System Files (OS specific), Unallocated Space, 
Drive Config (Partition Table/ Filing System specific), Email, Encrypted, Internet 
History, Recent Documents and User Profile. 
The <label> is descriptive text entered by the user. 
3.5.1.8 Integrity Types 
This defines the algorithm that is used throughout the DEB tag file for integrity 
assurance purposes. Each DEB shall use one or more algorithms. 
In order to specify the integrity algorithm used throughout the Tag file the DEB 
header shall include the line: 
Integrity Type : <Typel> <Type2>... 
The currently defined types are: 
MD5 - Message Digest 5 algorithm - RFC 1321 
SHA 1- Secure Hash Algorithm - RFC 3174 
Once the integrity algorithm type is defined the following specifies the Index and Bag 
file integrity hashes: 
IndexHash=<Hash> - Index file hash, created when index file is 
closed. 
BagHash=<Hash> - Bag file hash, created when bag file is closed. 
Tag File Hash . <Hash> - Tag 
file hash, created when tag file is 
closed 
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3.5.1.9 Compression Types 
This defines the algorithm that is used throughout the DEB or EU for data 
compression. 
In order to specify the compression algorithm used the tag file shall include the line: 
Compression=<Type> 
If the compression type definition is in the DEB Header then the compression type 
used applies to all the data in every bag file defined in the DEB. If the compression 
type definition is in the EU block then the compression type used applies to all the 
data in its corresponding EU bag file only. 
The currently defined types are: 
NONE - No compression used (default) 
ZLIB_O - bag file contents are compressed using the ZLIB fastest algorithm - RFC 
1950 
ZLIB_1 - bag file contents are compressed using the ZLIB fast algorithm - RFC 1950 
ZLIB_2 - bag file contents are compressed using the ZLIB default algorithm - RFC 
1950 
ZLIB_3 - bag file contents are compressed using the ZLIB maximum compression, 
slowest algorithm - RFC 1950 
3.5.1.10 Encryption Types 
This defines the encryption algorithm that is used throughout the DEB or EU. 
In order to specify the encryption algorithm used the tag file shall include the line: 
Encryption=<Type> 
If the encryption type definition is in the DEB Header then the encryption type used 
applies to all the data in every bag file defined in the DEB. If the encryption type 
definition is in the EU block then the encryption type used applies to all the data in its 
corresponding EU bag file only. 
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The currently defined types are: 
NONE - No encryption used (default). 
DES - FIPS-46-1 US National Bureau of Standards, "Data Encryption Standard". 
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 46-1, January 1988. 
AES - National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Specification for the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)" FIPS 197. November 26,2001. 
3.5.1.11 Timestamps 
All timestamps used in a DEB shall be of the format defined in ISO 8601, RFC3339, 
e. g.: 
YYYY-MM-DDThh: mm: ss. sTZD (eg 1997-07-16T19: 20: 30.45+01: 00) 
where: 
YYYY = four-digit year 
MM = two-digit month (01=January, etc. ) 
DD = two-digit day of month (01 through 31) 
T= date/time separator 
hh = two digits of hour (00 through 23) (am/pm NOT allowed) 
mm = two digits of minute (00 through 59) 
ss = two digits of second (00 through 59) 
s= one or more digits representing a decimal fraction of a 
second 
TZD = time zone designator (Z or +hh: mm or -hh: mm) 
3.5.1.12 DEB Footer 
When the DEB Tag file is closed after its initial creation it shall end with the 
following entry: 
[DEB Footer] 
Evidence Units in DEB : <number of Evidence Units in DEB> 
DEB Closed Date & Time : <Timestamp> 
Tag File Hash : <Hash> 
Page 62 
3.5.1.13 Tag Continuity Blocks (TCBs) 
The purpose of the Tag Continuity Block (TCB) is to provide an audit trail of 
applications that have accessed the DEB or an EU within the DEB. 
All applications requiring access to a DEB or EU shall do so through the Tag file. In 
doing so the Tag file shall be updated by appending a TCB to the end of the file. The 
accessing application identifier and version number are supplied by the calling 
application. 
Each TCB shall be of the format: 
[TCB] 
Date & Time : <Timestamp> 
Application ID : <App ID> 
Application version : <Application version identifier> 
Application Signature : <Hash of Application> 
Application Function : <App description/function> 
Host ID : <Host Identifier Description e. g Host name, IP Address> 
DEB Components Accessed : <ALL I EU number list> 
Tag File Hash : <Hash> 
3.5.2 Index File 
This is a plain text file which is tab delimited. 
. Inn (Index) file -a list detailing the contents of the corresponding Bnn file. The 
index could contain details such as a list of filenames, folder paths, and timestamp 
information relating to the contents of the digital information in the bag. Alternatively 
it could contain details of the physical device, for example the make, model and serial 
number of the device from which digital evidence has been obtained. 
Its exact format and structure is defined in the Meta-tag information in the . tag 
file. 
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3.5.3 Bag File 
This file contains the evidential data/information. 
The Bnn (Bag) file contains the actual evidence captured and may be either: 
9 Raw binary information. For example, from a raw device capture application such 
as ̀ dd' or an EnCase evidence file `EO1' format data; 
" Arbitrary collection of files. For example a manual selection of files from logical 
volume acquisition; 
" Categorized / grouped collection of files. For example, one bag containing all text 
files, another containing all MS word documents, or another containing all JPEG 
graphics files etc; 
" Structured binary information. For example, from network packet capture. 
" An alternative approach is to create one Bag file per actual file acquired. For 
example, one JPEG file into one Bag file. This results in very large Tag files and 
is probably not the most practical or efficient way to store information. 
3.6 DEB API Implementation 
In order to create, open and update a Digital Evidence Bag, a number of basic 
functions are required to manipulate and access the component parts. The following 
Pascal definitions define the DEB API. Pascal was chosen due to its lingua franca 
properties. The functions belong in two main classes, those for DEB creation and 
DEB access. Additionally a number of record types are defined to group sets of 
information that are required to be passed into functions or used to maintain state of a 
DEB object. Three have been defined, they are: 
" Case Details record; 
9 Evidence Unit Details record; 
" Bag Object Summary Information record. 
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The definition of the three record types now follows: 
// Case details record 
TCaseDetails = record 
sinvAgency : string; 
sinvOfficer : string; 
H Investigating Agency 
// Investigating Officer 
sExhibitNumber : string; // Case unique Exhibit Number 
sDescription : string; Brief Description of contents of DEB 
sLocation : string; Location where evidence was seized 
sCaseReferenceNumber: string; Case Reference Number 
sHostiD : string; // Optional: Host Identifier that evidence was 
// acquired on 
sPassword : string; // Optional: Password/PIN/Pass phrase required to 
// access 
H device/host 
sNotes : string; // Optional: Additional text case notes 
slndexFormat : string; // Optional: DEB Index Format, may be specified per 
//EU 
end; 
H EU details record 
TEUDetails = record 
iEUNum : integer; // EU Number 
slndexHash : string; // Index File hash 
sBagHash : string; 
sContentType : string; 
sEUlndexFormat : string; 
iFpsColumn : integer; 
iFlsColumn : integer; 
iFColumn : integer; 
iPColumn : integer; 
H Bag File hash 
EU Content Type description 
EU Index Format if specified per EU 
// store column in Index Format that contains physical size 
// store column in Index Format that contains logical size 
// store column in Index Format that contains FileName 
// store column in Index Format that contains Provenance 
iCColumn : integer; // store column in Index Format that contains Command Line 
// Input 
iHashColumn : integer; // store column in Index Format that contains Hash 
end; 
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// Bag Object Summary Information 
TBagObj = record 
sF : string; 
sP : string; 
sC : string; 
sHash : string; 
IFIs : Longint; 
Fps : Longint; 




HC= Command Line Input 
H Hash 
H Fls = Logical File Size 
// Fps = Physical File Size 
// Offset into bag file to start of selected object 
3.6.1 DEB Creation functions 
The functions that are required to create a DEB must be able to create and populate 
the tag file and then be used to add additional Evidence Units as required by the 
particular application. Functionality must also be provided to fill the bag files with 
different types of data (e. g. binary or textual) from differing sources (e. g. file or 
memory buffer). One DEB may be created at a time, it is not envisaged that a creation 
application would be required to simultaneously create and populate multiple DEBs. 
DEBCreate( sAppVersion : string; 
sCopyright : string; 
CaseDetailsln : TCaseDetails; 
slCaseFiles : TStringList; 
simageDestinationPath : string; 
tCompressionAlgorithm : TcompressionAlgorithm; 
tEncryptionAlgorithm : TencryptionAlgorithm; 
tlntegrityAlgorithm : TintegrityAlgorithm ): boolean; 
Purpose 
This is the DEB class constructor that creates a DEB tag file 
and populates the DEB header with case detail information, DEB 
creation application detail. The return value indicates success 
(true) or failure (false). 
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Function 
CreateNewEvidenceUnit(sContentType : string) : integer; 
Purpose 
To create a new Evidence Unit(Index and Bag files) within the 
currently open DEB. This appends new EU information to the tag file. 
The return value is the number of the EU created (greater than or 
equal to zero), a negative value indicates an error. 
Function 
WriteEvidenceDataBuffer( iEUNum : integer; 
byteBuf : Array of Byte; 
iBufSize : integer) : integer; 
Purpose 
To write information to the specified Evidence Unit. The return 
value indicates the number of bytes actually written, a negative 
value indicates an error. 
Function 
function AddCaselndexEntry( iEUNum : integer; 
sEntryType : string; 
iEntrySize : int64; 
sEntryHash : string) : integer; 
Purpose 
To add a new entry to the specified EU Index file. The return 
value indicates the index number of the entry added, a negative value 
indicates an error. 
Function 
CloseEvidenceUnit(iEUNum : integer; ) : boolean; 
Purpose 
This closes the specified Evidence Unit. This involves 
generating an integrity hash of the contents of the Index and Bag 
files. These values are then written to the Tag file. The return 





This closes the DEB Tag and any open Evidence Unit files. If an 
EU is open an integrity hash of the contents of the Index and Bag 
files is generated and written to the Tag file. An integrity hash of 
the Tag file is then generated and a DEB Footer is then appended to 
the Tag file. The return value indicates success (true) or failure 
(false) . 
3.6.2 DEB Access functions 
The functions that are required for DEB access have to be able to open an existing 
DEB and append continuity information to the Tag file. The Tag file has to be parsed 
in order to determine the quantity, content type and format of each Evidence Unit. 
Functionality also has to be provided in order to locate and access information within 
the Bag file of a specified EU. The information appended to the Tag file provides the 
basic mechanism to record the processes that have been performed on the DEB. 
Additionally the detection of corruption or integrity failures in the structure of the 
DEB should be detected. This could be due to a number of factors such as: 
" media errors; 
" deliberate and malicious changes to the contents of the DEB; 
" DEB creation application terminating abnormally, resulting in a partially 
populated and/or incorrectly closed DEB. 
If an error is detected when a DEB is opened and accessed this could initiate some 
kind of error correction or automated repair process. The quantity and location of 
errors detected in the DEB structure will affect the possibility and effectiveness of any 
such repair. This would also necessitate recording the process and functions 
performed in order to correct the errors. How this would be achieved is an area for 
further consideration. 
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Open DEB(sTagFileName : string; sAppiD : string; sAppVer : string; sFunctionDesc : 
string): boolean; 
Purpose 
This is the DEB class constructor that Opens a DEB, parses the 
tag file to determine EU information and appends a TCB to the tag 
file. The application name, version and a short textual description 
should also be supplied. These details are included in the TCB. The 
calling Application Signature (hash) is calculated and written to the 
TCB along with the current system timestamp. The return value 
indicates success (true) or failure (false). 
Function 
GetNumEUs() : integer; 
Purpose 
The return value indicates how many Evidence Units are in the 
current DEB, a negative value indicates an error. 
Function 
GetEUContentType(iEUNum : integer) : string; 
Purpose 
The return string indicates the content type description of a 
particular Evidence Unit, a NULL return indicates an error. 
Function 
CloseEU(iEUNum : integer) : boolean; 
Purpose 
To close a particular Evidence Unit i. e. Index and Bag files. 
The return value indicates success (true) or failure (false). 
Function 
GetEUlndexFormat(iEUNum : integer) : string; 
Purpose 
The return string shows the Index Format definition of a 
particular Evidence Unit, a NULL return indicates an error. 
Page 69 
Function 
OpenEU(iEUNum: integer) : boolean; 
Purpose 
To open a particular Evidence Unit i. e. Index and Bag files. 
The system state of the currently open EU is maintained internally 
within DEB function. The return value indicates success (true) or 
failure (false). 
Function 
GetlndexEntryFirst(iEUNum : integer) : string; 
Purpose 
The return string shows the first index entry from the 
specified Evidence Unit Index file, a NULL return indicates an error. 
Function 
GetlndexEntryNext(iEUNum : integer) : string; 
Purpose 
The return string shows the next index entry from the specified 
Evidence Unit Index file, a NULL return indicates an error. 
Function 
GetBagEntrySummaryDetails(iEUNum : integer; ilndexNum : integer) : TBagObj; 
Purpose 
To get the Bag Object Summary Information record of a 




iEUNum : integer; 
ilndexNum : integer; 
(Offset : Longint; 
Buf : Pointer; 
iBufSize : integer) : integer; 
To return a pointer to the data contained in a bag file 
referenced by a particular Index file entry or offset within that 
entry. The return value indicates number of bytes read from the bag, 
a negative value indicates an error. 
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3.6.3 Alternatives to using the DEB API 
Ideally, information stored in a DEB should be accessed via applications that 
implement the DEB API and are therefore capable of maintaining the continuity and 
audit trail. Enforcing DEB access policy has not been considered in this work and is 
an area to be considered in future DEB development. Using the API functions to 
access the contents of a DEB maintains the integrity of the DEB as the correct 
protocols are used and the DEB is `resealed' correctly once evidence population, 
examination or analysis has been performed (see section 3.3.1.4 discussing the ACID 
properties). This could lead to the development of `certified' DEB applications which 
can be verified that the DEB API has been implemented correctly and even the 
registration of certified applications. Additionally DEB hardware devices could be 
developed; this may assist with the confidentiality and key management issues 
identified earlier. This would be of particular use when there is a requirement to 
distribute evidential material to the defence, international investigations (cross 
jurisdiction) or other agencies e. g. the National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC) 
for special processing. 
If the DEB API is not used then it may be possible to access information stored in the 
Bag file directly; however there are a number of issues that should be borne in mind 
when using a direct access method: 
9 Difficulty in determining which bag files to open - This would require manual 
parsing of the tag file to determine the content type of each evidence unit and 
therefore which bag file set to open. 
" Manual checking required to verify the integrity of the bag file set - Once the 
bag file of interest has been identified a manual comparison of the integrity 
hashes of the bag file contents with the signature stored in the tag file should 
be performed. 
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Until the DEB format and DEB aware analysis applications are widely adopted 
accessing the contents of a bag file directly may permit current forensic toolsets to be 
used. This would not be recommended, however it does permit a certain degree of 
backwards compatibility and does not negate the financial outlay required for 
purchase of the toolsets. 
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4 DEB Toolkit Implementation and Framework Demonstrators 
Ideally, DEBs should only be accessed by `DEB aware' applications i. e. those that 
understand the structure of the DEB and therefore can update and maintain the 
continuity of the information stored within the DEB (see section 3.6.3 for discussion 
on alternatives for non DEB aware applications). DEB aware applications fall into 
one of two categories; creation tools or access tools. The operational scenarios that 
these are used in place differing demands on the user interface and complexity of the 
particular application, not to mention the vast range of disparate devices that 
information may be obtained from. 
To accommodate these differing scenarios a toolkit has been developed that allows for 
the creation and subsequent access of a DEB. The toolkit has been written in the 
Delphi Pascal programming language. It was felt important to use an environment that 
permitted development on a Microsoft Windows platform because the majority of 
digital forensic investigators are more familiar with that operating system and using 
applications on that system. Delphi is an ideal tool for this purpose as the code is 
relatively easy to understand and implement a graphical user interface to an 
application. 
The translation of the core functionality into other programming languages and 
operating systems should be relatively trivial as the DEB tag and index files are text 
based. The majority of common programming languages provide basic string input, 
output and manipulation routines that can support the requirements of the DEB 
framework. 
The following sections discuss a set of applications for DEB creation, viewer and 
logging applications that were created to implement the DEB framework. All 
applications use a common library implemented as a Delphi unit. The `DEB. pas' unit 
contains public functions to create. open and manipulate the various components of a 
DEB. 
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4.1 DEB Creation Tool Demonstrator 
Typically, when a digital device is seized a form of imaging or copying of the storage 
media within the device is performed. DEB creation and imaging tools initially have 
to create the tag file and record the provenance information of who, where and when 
the capture commenced. Ideally these tools should be easy to use because if mistakes 
are made it could result in the potential for evidence being destroyed, changed, 
overwritten, or the opportunity missed to seize the information within a live 
environment. 
The DEB tag file is built sequentially; Header, EU descriptions and DEB Footer. The 
number and content type of the EUs is determined by the configuration and 
functionality afforded by the particular acquisition application. This in turn 
determines the `Index Format' definition used within the entire DEB or particular 
EUs. 
At the completion of the acquisition process the EU (index and bag file) integrity hash 
values are calculated and finally the tag file integrity hash is calculated and written to 
the tag file. This effectively seals the DEB until analysis is commenced. 
Figure 16 shows a screen capture of the DEB Writer - API Demonstrator. This 
application may be used to create a basic DEB consisting of an arbitrary number of 
Evidence Units. The data written to the bag file using this application can be either 
text strings or a buffer of binary data. When used in a `real' application the bag would 
be populated with data obtained from a device capture, files, command line input or 
any other digital source. 
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Investigating Officer Phd Turner Case Reference URN/1 
Exhibit Identifier PT 
_1 
Host Identifier My Host 
Description of exhibit Demonstration Evidence Capture Host Access Password Password/PIN/Passphrase 
Notes Notes 
Index Format ;4 Provenential Into Fv-P Created Time ii Hash p Dev Capacity I CLI Command - Device 
FAT NTFS EU 0- Case Notes - supplementary files 
DEB Destination Path (a%temp\ Import ý Supplementary files 0 3 
Create DEB 
Current Evidence Unit Count 0 
Create New EU 
Evidential Text Information Write Evidence Data - String 
Write Evidence Data - Device 
7 Close DEB 
Figure 16 - DEB Writer API demonstrator 
The numbered sections (1 to 7) should be read in conjunction with the application 
flow diagram and correspond to the sequence of operations shown in Figure 17. 
Each step in the flow diagram perform the following functions: 
1) The case details are entered by the user, this is the information held in a `Case 
Details' record and is comprised of the following: 
" Investigating Agency; 
" Investigating Officer; 
" Case unique Exhibit Identifier; 
"a Brief Description of contents of DEB/ exhibit captured; 
" the Location where evidence was seized; 
"a Case Reference Identifier; 
and the following optional details: 
" Host Identifier that evidence was acquired on; 
" Password/PIN/Pass phrase required to access device/host-, 
" Additional text case notes. 
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Figure 17 - DEB Writer Flow diagram 
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2) Allows for the Index Format to be specified. This is a list of the information that is 
stored in each Index File record entry. In the DEB Writer API Demonstrator only a 
global DEB Index Format may be specified. However, the DEB format does permit 
separate Index Format definitions per Evidence Unit. 
3) Evidence Unit 0 is reserved for Case Notes storage. This can be documents or 
photographs or any other arbitrary files containing information relating to the case or 
exhibit prior to commencement of the data or device acquisition. For example, it is 
common practice to take a series of photographs of a computer or device illustrating 
its notable features as the examination is commenced. These may include front, rear, 
side and internal photographs of a computer together with a photograph of the storage 
media device removed from the system. These can be marked for inclusion in the 
DEB. 
4) Create DEB and Open EU - This involves creating the DEB tag file and writing the 
DEB header and acquisition information. Evidence Unit 0 is comprised of an Index 
and Bag file pair which are populated with the case notes and then closed. Evidence 
Unit 1 is then created. 
Function Call Sequence using function definitions in section 3.6.1: 
DEBCreate 
CreateNewEvidenceUnit 
5) A new EU may be created. If this is done, the current EU is closed and a hash of its 
contents is calculated and written to the tag file. A new EU comprised of an Index and 
Bag file is created. 
Function Call Sequence using function definitions in section 3.6.1: 
If EvidenceUnitlsOpen then CloseEvidenceUnit 
else 
CreateNewEvidenceUnit 
6) Either textual or binary data can be written to the currently open EU. Each time a 
riet item of data is placed in the Bag a new index entry is written. The exact format 
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of the entry depends upon the Index Format specified; however, this would typically 
include provenential information, a timestamp of when the data was captured, the size 
of information acquired and an integrity hash of the data. 




7) DEB closed. This involves closing the current EU and calculating a hash of its 
Index and Bag file contents. These details are written to the Tag file and then a hash 
of the tag file is calculated and a DEB Footer written to the Tag file before closure. 
This acts as the DEB seal that is synonymous with the physical evidence seal attached 
to an evidence bag. 
Function Call Sequence using function definitions in section 3.6.1: 
If EvidenceUnitlsOpen then CloseEvidenceUnit 
DEBClose 
4.2 DEB Access/Viewer Tool Demonstrator 
Once digital information has been captured and a DEB created, further investigation 
and examination tasks are usually required to discover further facts and correlate 
information. These analysis tasks may themselves output further distilled information, 
the provenance of which should also be recorded. These analysis tools can either 
extract information from the original DEB to a new DEB or build a new EU appended 
to the existing DEB. 
In either scenario, to be DEB aware, an application must access a DEB by first 
parsing the tag file. This allows the application to determine the number and content 
type of EUs and verify their integrity hashes. 
The analysis tool then appends a TCB to the end of the tag file detailing the EU 
accessed, the provided description of the function that the analysis tool performs, and 
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when the DEB was accessed. On completion of the analysis a new tag seal hash value 
should be generated to reseal the DEB. 
The demonstrator currently writes the TCB when the DEB is opened (a single 
operation). The TCB update process requires further definition in order that a TCB 
can successfully record when a DEB is both opened and closed (two phase operation). 
This permits the subsequent detection of an access application process failure and can 
also be used to time the duration of a particular process. 
Figure 18 shows a screen capture of the DEB Viewer application. This application 
may be used to open a DEB and catalogue the Evidence Units and their content type 
(4). An Evidence Unit may be selected and then the corresponding Index file (5) is 
parsed. An Index entry may then be selected and the data that it references is then 
viewed. 
Load DEB DEB Vrowm Tanporaiy Diecto yc üempA 
Number of Evidence UnRs in DEB :3 
pphcation Version 10 
pplication Function Open and View contents of a Digital Evidence Beg (DEB) 
pphcation Signature : 4A79AC85C554E3599D36D6468 21 86 738 
ag File Hash : CB 7494EA3796D 719D 25D 3EF3D 394F24E 
'CB] 
ate & Time : 02/08/20071527: 54 
pplication ID DEB Viewer 
pplication Version 1.0 
pplication Function : Open and View contents of a Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) 
pphcation Signature : 4A794C85C554E3599D36DBA6621 86738 
ag Fie Hash: 7EA5C8657D1729929694D688C8897941 
EU Summary 
EU G Content Type 
0 ContentType=Case Notes 
1 ContentType-CLI-Netwoik Configwation 
2 ContentType-CLI-Directory Listing 
Index View 
[Command Created PhysicalSize IMD5Hash 
1rr rr rr . ra 




Figure 18 - DEB Viewer demonstrator 
Each of the items (1 through 5) marked on Figure 18 is now discussed and an 
explanation of the function and API procedures called is given. 
1) Load DEB - When a DEB is selected for loading into the DEB 
Viewer the 
application title bar is updated to show the name of the DEB selected. The tag file 
is parsed sequentially for the following: 
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Index Format - this is stored as the global definition that may be 
overridden by that specified in an individual Evidence Unit; 
Evidence Units - each EU record is parsed to extract the content type. 
Index and Bag file integrity hashes. These are stored in an EU Details record; 
DEB Footer is parsed to verify that the EU count matches the number 
of EU records parsed. 
Once the tag file has been successfully parsed a Tag Continuity Block (TCB) is 
appended to the end of the Tag file that records the timestamp of when the DEB was 
opened, the Application Identifier, signature and description of the utility that is being 
used. 
Function Call Sequence using function definitions in section 3.6.2: 
OpenDEB 
2) A directory can be set for the application to export information from the DEB. 
3) This pane displays the Tag file contents for viewing after the DEB has been 
opened and a TCB appended. A count of the number of EUs found in the DEB is 
also displayed. 
Function Call Sequence: 
ViewTag 
4) This pane shows the Evidence Unit summary depicting the list of EUs in the 
current DEB and their Content Type description. Selecting an EU entry causes the 
EU Index to be parsed. 
Function Call Sequence using function definitions in section 3.6.2: 
GetNumEUs 
GetEUContentType 
5) This pane is used to show the contents of the selected EU Index entry. As each 
Index entry is read an internal table is built to permit rapid access to the evidential 
data stored in the bag file. Selecting an Index entry causes another window to be 
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displayed that shows the data (in the form of a hexadecimal view) the entry relates 
to. The example shown below is for the command line application `ipconfig /all', 
an example of the hexadecimal view window is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 - Hexadecimal display of DEB Viewer demonstrator 
Function Call - To extract data from the Bag file 
GetBagData 
0123455725ABGDEF TEXT 
    U® O ®®M E   
imar yr Dns Suffix 
MEME®®®® ®®®M 
------- E. mm®®®®® ®- Nod 
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6) In addition to displaying the selected entry in a hexadecimal view it is possible to 
view the entry in its native view. The default viewer in this application for text- 
based data is Microsoft's Notepad application. An example of the native view 
output shown in Figure 20. 
Function Call Sequence - Native View 
GetBagEntrySummaryDetails 
GetBagData 
File Edit Format Views Help 
windows IP configuration 
Host Name 





q. ginetiq-tim. net 
ens. qlnietlq. corn 
Ethernet adapter ERIS_Local Area connection: 
connection-specific DNS Suffix .. Description ...........: 3Com 3C920 Integrated Fast Ethernet Physical Address. ........ 00-OB-DB-OA-BB-4A Dhcp Enabled. ........... No IP Address ............. 25.8.9.1 subnet mask ............ 255.192.0.0 Default Gateway .......... 25.0.0.254 DNS Servers ............ 25.254.0.2 
> 
Figure 20 - Native View output example 
4.3 Enhancing Current Applications - DEB Command Line Wrapper 
As part of a digital investigation it is common to use the logs generated by 
applications that are already installed on a system or to utilise command line 
applications to capture a snapshot of current system information. Ideally an operating 
system would have forensic logging capabilities built-in. However, this is currently 
not the case without adding additional applications. The DEB framework and API can 
be used to provide an enhanced logging and command line capture facility for 
currently installed applications. 
The DEB command line wrapper application provides an interface to execute any 
command line application and capture the output in a DEB. The application initially 
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creates a DEB and populates the DEB with case or incident reference information. 
The Command Line Application Wrapper is a variant of the DEB creation tool and 
utilises the same function call sequence described in section 4.1. Command line 
application tools and utilities can then be executed in an arbitrary order to record: 
0 system state; 
0 process lists; 
9 network connection information; 
" network activity; 
0 directory listings; 
" memory capture; 
" log files; 
" user information. 
Figure 21 illustrates how these various types of information can be segregated into 
various EUs within a DEB. The division of information into separate EUs is an 
arbitrary decision made by the investigator. However, following a methodical process 
can permit each EU to contain similar types of information. The command and any 
associated parameters are stored in the Index file and the generated output resulting 
from command execution is recorded in the Bag file. 
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Figure 21 - DEB Information segregation 
Figure 22 is a screen capture of the DEB Command-Line Application Wrapper utility 
that can be used to acquire information from the command line into a DEB. 
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I)EB Command Line Application ý rapper 
Investigating Agency ICir, etif Location Malvern 
Investigating Officer Philip Turner Case Reference URN 1 
Exhibit Number PT-1 Host Identifier Host Name / IP Address 
Description of exhibit Ernail Server Host Access Password Password/PIN/Passphrase 
Notes Notes 
Index Format [ Command Line i Created Time I;; i Output Size ; +ý Hash 
DEB Destination Patr, c. , reap, EU 0- Case Notes - supplementary files 
Content Type Label Network Configuration 
Import Supplementaryfiles: 0 
Create DEB 
Current Evidence Unit Count 0 
Create New EU 
Enter command into dialogue box and'Execute Command' to capture output into Digital Evidence Bag 
Execute Command 
Close DEB 
Figure 22 - DEB Command Line Application Wrapper screenshot 
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5 Digital Investigation Scenarios & Case Studies 
Given the nature and sensitivity of the material encountered in digital investigations. 
and resources available to this project together with the authors experience 
undertaking digital investigation work, the following scenarios have been considered. 
These are briefly described and then consideration is given to how the DEB 
framework may be applied to them. The scenarios are derived from personal 
experience and from external texts aimed at educating and testing the skills of would- 
be incident response investigators. They broadly divide into two main groups i. e. 
static digital forensics and `live' or dynamic environment forensics. 
5.1 Device / Media Imaging 
The traditional forensic scenario is that of static media acquisition. This typically 
entails the entire sequential capture of data from an item of media or device into a 
single homologous unit. This process permits a clone (exact copy) to be created 
and/or requires the analysis application to be able to interpret the internal data 
structures in order to `make sense' of the information and represent it in a more 
conventional and easily interpretable way to the investigator. 
An example of this would be the data capture (imaging) of a hard disk extracted from 
a computer. A clone may be created by writing the image in a sequential manner to 
another device or viewing the contents of the image through an application that can 
interpret the disk filing system. 
The DEB framework supports this scenario by containing the media image in a single 
EU bag file. The corresponding EU index file holds descriptive information about the 
source and size of information and optionally its integrity checksum. 
Additionally, the index file may contain information about the fragments (chunks) of 
data held in component bag files. For example, when a 250GB hard disk is captured it 
may be stored in files no larger than that of the capacity of a CD/DVD or other 
backup media. 
Figure 23 shows Evidence Units containing multiple component bag files and related 
index entries. The size of the bag file component parts is limited to an arbitrary value 
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Figure 23 - DEB structure diagram 
A basic media imager has been implemented to demonstrate how a DEB can store 
information obtained from a device in a static environment. Figure 24 shows a screen 
capture of the DEB Imager. This utility is based on the DEB API and allows an entire 
device to be imaged. The available fixed and removable devices are displayed in the 
dialogue box (1). When a device is selected and a DEB created, the progress of the 
image capture is shown in the dialogue box (2). The Index Format specified in the tag 
file records the Provenance Device Description <P>, the capacity of the device 
<Dcap>, and the time the imaging commenced <Tcre>. The Index Format utilised in 
this scenario is fixed and embedded in the application. 
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Figure 24 - DEB Imager screenshot 
5.1.2 Selective Imaging 
`Selective Imaging' is a term that has been used by many forensic practitioners for a 
while now. This is a term that is generally associated with the decision not to acquire 
all possible information during the capture process. Even in some official good 
practice guides (ACPO 2003) it is now recognised that `partial or selective file 
copying may be considered as an alternative' when it may not be practical to acquire 
everything. The usual reason for applying a selective approach is the quantity of 
information that may have to be acquired. Other reasons for performing a selective 
acquisition include, but are not limited to, forensic triage, intelligence gathering and 
legal requirements. There may be legal reasons why a selective approach should be 
adopted, for example, a case involving Legal Professional Privilege (LPP) material. 
Adopting a selective approach has risks associated with it as highlighted in Kenneally 
and Brown's papers (Kenneally 2005a) (Kenneally 2005b), but this in no way means 
the evidence should not be gathered in any less scientific or rigorous manner. 
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There are several types of selective imaging techniques that could be used (Turner 
2006). They are: 
9 Manual selective imaging; 
" Semi-automatic selective imaging; 
9 Automatic selective imaging. 
Manual selective imaging is where the forensic investigator chooses exactly which 
files are captured. For example, the investigator can use an interface similar to that of 
a file browser and is able to navigate the directory tree and arbitrarily choose which 
files to acquire. 
Semi-automatic selective imaging is where the forensic investigator decides which 
file types or categories of information to capture. This may be based on file extension, 
file signature or file hash. When using a selective approach based on file hashes it is 
important to record which files are present and their provenance, even though the 
contents of each file may not be captured. It would also be prudent to record 
referential hash set information. 
Automatic selective imaging is where the investigator selects the source and 
destination devices and the imager automatically acquires the evidence. This is 
accomplished in a selective manner according to pre-configured parameters or the 
particular circumstances pertaining to the case / investigation. 
The different operating modes that a selective approach presents to the investigator, 
combined with the flexibility and many options for classifying and grouping 
information, potentially makes it very complex. One of the difficulties with selective 
imaging is recording the provenance of each item selected. The issues associated with 
provenance and how DEBs store multiple provenance descriptions are discussed in 
section 3.4. 
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Additionally, the DEB framework makes provision for recording the selection criteria 
used in a selective approach. This information would be stored in EUO used for case 
notes. For example, selecting a particular file type to capture but not actually finding 
any files of that type (a negative result) may be significant. The case notes could even 
be created in a machine processable form thereby permitting the resumption of the 
capture process should the first phase of the examination prove negative. This feature 
has not been considered in this work but it is recognised as an area for further 
development. 
5.1.3 Intelligent Imaging 
An `Intelligent Imaging' approach is the process of capturing the knowledge and 
experience of domain experts and applying it to an intelligent system. This enables the 
investigator who is not technically proficient, and is aware only of the type of 
investigation they are conducting, to use this type of imager. For example, they may 
be investigating a fraud, intellectual property theft, or possession and distribution of 
indecent material, and may be unfamiliar with what file types or locations where 
information may reside that is pertinent to their case. They simply select the type of 
inquiry that is being conducted and the imager has the necessary intelligence built into 
it to acquire everything that would normally be relevant to the case. 
There are however risks and difficulties that have to be overcome in order to adopt 
this approach: 
" How do you go about capturing and combining the knowledge of legal domain 
experts and technically proficient digital domain practitioners? This is a 
recognised problem in the knowledge acquisition field (Mitchell 1998). 
" How do you know that everything relevant to the case under investigation has 
been acquired and that evidence relating to other offences has not been 
overlooked? 
These two points are outside the scope of this work, but need to be considered in the 
future when tools and systems have been developed that are capable of performing 
automatic selective imaging. 
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5.1.4 Selective & Intelligent Imaging using Digital Evidence Bags 
The DEB framework is able to accommodate selective and intelligent imaging 
techniques by the use of flexible EU content types and Index Format specifications. 
This also allows a single DEB to store information obtained from a disparate range of 
digital devices and record multiple provenential reference types for each item of 
information stored in the bag file (Figure 25). The `Category Definition' and `Imager 





PDA Cell phone 




i Iý IIý Iý Iii 
Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) 
Figure 25 - Disparate digital device capture into a single DEB 
The following diagram (Figure 26) shows how a DEB may be populated in a selective 
or intelligent data capture environment. The grouping of similar information can be 
seen in the particular EU content types. The grouping of information can be arbitrary 
but some possible grouping classifications are: 
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" File Extension; 
" File Signature; 
" File Category (e. g. Document, Pictures, Archives, Spreadsheets); 
" Files within a particular hash set (e. g. paedophile image classification); 
" Files not within a particular hash set (e. g. not a particular OS or 
application); 
" System Configuration Files; 
" Application Log Files; 





































Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) 
Figure 26 - DEB Structure for selective / intelligent imaging 
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A more detailed diagram illustrating the contents of the tag, index and bag file is 
shown in Figure 27. This shows how the multiple provenance storage flexibility and 
each component EU relates to the tag file entries. 
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Figure 27 - DEB Selective Image structure 
5.2 Incident Response - System Management 
Many organisations and companies have their own computer incident response teams 
and network investigators. These teams are often assembled at very short notice when 
an incident occurs or anomalous system behaviour is detected. The problem with this 
approach is that within a very short time period, personnel with the necessary 
technical skills have to start working together to diagnose the behaviour, problem or 
attack . 
The term `System Administrator' (SA) is used to cover the processes. tasks or 
operations performed by the system administrator, system operator, incident 
investigator, security administrator or network investigator. In effect, anyone who 
may have any role in determining the problem, cause or effect of any abnormal or 
unusual system behaviour. 
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At the onset of the incident all that may be known is that something on a system or 
network is not working as expected and the goal is usually to restore the service. 
capability or system to its normal level (Turner 2007b). In the first instance the SA 
would probably be either the first person to detect a problem or the first person to start 
examining the system as the result of a helpdesk call from a user. The eventual 
outcome is usually far from the expectations of the SA or examiner. 
In most cases the problem may be benign, or user error, but in the instance where a 
more serious problem is discovered a more comprehensive and rigorous examination 
or investigation may follow. This would especially be true if a system had failed 
completely, or if it was discovered that information had been lost or stolen. 
The problem with this approach is that the SA may already have inadvertently 
modified a system or lost the opportunity to accurately record the system state that 
was discovered. This puts them in a vulnerable position should blame be apportioned 
to them at a later date. In addition, it may be the case that the SA cannot obtain 
repeatable results when they realise that there is a serious problem. 
Ideally a SA should be forensically trained and thereby be part of a coherent forensic 
approach with the incident response or network investigation procedure that they 
might normally adopt. The forensic aspect should be an integral part of any system 
administration role that is responsible for operating any business critical or business 
operational system and should be part of a forensic readiness strategy (Rowlinson 
2004). 
5.2.1 Incident Response - Common Tools 
The SA usually has a vast range of tools available at their disposal to monitor system 
performance, determine system configuration or to fault find system problems. The 
majority of these tools and utilities are very specialised in the function they perform 
and the information they provide. Many of these tools are console applications and 
run as command line utilities. Furthermore, they are often packaged with the 
operating system. 
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The problem with these tools is they are designed to provide information, but are not 
designed to provide any form of integrity assurance or record when those utilities 
were executed. From a forensic perspective they provide no audit record about the 
timestamp or actions taken, or results returned from running those utilities. 
Admittedly the SA, with forethought, could choose to pipe the output to a log file, but 
this still has no mechanism to assure the integrity of the output data. Furthermore, the 
SA would rarely keep handwritten notes of the actions taken, or results obtained 
whilst trying to diagnose and examine a system. 
This typical scenario results in the SA being unable to justify or even demonstrate to 
colleagues the system state as they found it, never mind being able to assure that they 
were not the cause or a contributor to the problem or incident. 
There are many tools that may be used to diagnose system behaviour (Sorenson 
2003a), (Sorenson 2003b), (Carvey 2001), (Microsoft 2007d). In addition to these 
tools there are toolkits available with many of these applications already compiled 
into a compendium (Helix2007), (Foundstone 2007). 
This situation is further endorsed by the `Hacker's Challenge' (Schiffman 2001) 
which sites 20 scenarios where by systems were compromised and investigations 
started to identify the cause of the problem. An analysis of these scenarios showed 
that the sources of information used to base an investigation came from two main 
areas; log files and command line utilities. 
5.2.2 System and Application operation log files 
The operating system log files and application log files are excellent sources of 
information to establish system behaviour and problems. These are typically used to 
record a diverse range of actions such as user logon and logoff, system service start up 
and print job auditing. Other more obscure tasks can also be recorded in log files, 
such as when anti-virus software commenced or when Microsoft Office documents 
were opened and created (Microsoft 20017e). 
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In (Schiffman 2001) the following system logs were used as sources of valuable 
hacker information: 
" Microsoft IIS server logs (Microsoft 2007j); 
" MS Exchange server logs (Microsoft 2007g); 
9 Virtual Private Network (VPN) logs; 
" Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) logs, snort logs; 
0 Syslog; 
" Firewall logs; 
" Router logs; 
9 Physical access logs. 
The main feature most system and application logs have in common is that they 
record the date and time stamp of when a particular event or action took place. From 
an investigation perspective (although this is very useful and important information) it 
lacks any form of integrity check or error detection information. 
The correlation of log information with other information found on the system or 
other connected systems is vitally important if the log information is to be relied 
upon. This is because some log formats are easily tampered with and could involve 
entries being deleted, modified or timestamps changed. The detection of these 
alterations can be difficult if the log file information is considered in isolation. The 
correlation of information and timestamps is discussed further in (Forte 2004) and 
(Schatz 2006). 
Wrapping log files in a DEB addresses these issues by providing integrity, 
provenance and continuity mechanisms. The investigator is also certifying the state of 
the log file at the time of capture there by allowing subsequent changes to be 
identified whether due to accidental or malicious means. 
Page 96 
5.2.3 System Administration Tools - Command line utilities 
All operating systems come with some utilities that allow users to create and manage 
information, with the potential to connect to other systems and transfer information 
between those systems. This basic functionality and the tools that provide such 
functionality can also be used by system administrators during the course of an 
investigation to both establish the operational state and connectivity of a system. 
The following lists the common utilities (Schiffman 2001) used on Unix systems to 
obtain system information: 
" ps -Af - list all processes running on a system; 
" netstat - to capture current state of the network connections; 
" lsof - used to find out which processes had files open; 
" telnet - used to connect to remote host or open port on a system; 
" date - used to print or set the system date and time; 
" Is - list directory contents; 
" ping - send ICMP ECHO_REQUEST packets to network hosts to ascertain 
if the address exists and is responsive. 
The following lists the common utilities used on a Microsoft Windows OS to obtain 
system information: 
" Fport - used to identify unknown open ports and their associated applications, 
http: //www. foundstone. com/us/resources/proddesc/fport. htm [Accessed 10 
September 2007]; 
" Attacker - TCP/UDP port listener, 
http: //www. foundstone. com/us/resources/proddesc/attacker. htm [Accessed 10 
September 2007]; 
" Netstat - Displays active TCP connections. ports on which the computer 
is 
listening, Ethernet statistics. the IP routing table, IPv 4 statistics (for the IP. 
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ICMP, TCP, and UDP protocols), and IPv6 statistics (for the IPv6, ICMPv6. 
TCP over IPv6, and UDP over IPv6 protocols), 
http: //www. microsoft. com/resources/documentation/windows/x /pall/proddocs/ 
en-us/netstat. mspx [Accessed 10 September 2007]; 
" Pslist - used to show process and thread lists on local and remote systems, 
http: //www. microsoft. com/technet/sysinternals/Utilities/PsList. mspx 
[Accessed 10 September 2007]; 
9 Auditpol - list systems auditing policy - Windows Resource Kit; 
9 Psloggedon - displays logged on users, 
http: //www. microsoft. com/technet/sysinternals/Utilities/PsLogged0n. mspx 
[Accessed 10 September 2007]; 
9 Dumpel - dump event log for local or remote system, 
http: //www. microsoft. com/windows2000/techinfo/reskit/tools/existin /g dumpel 
-o"asp [Accessed 10 September 2007]; 
" Regdump - tool for outputting all or part of the registry. 
The main feature that all these utilities perform is to provide information for the SA 
about the system state, or to perform a specific function. In contrast to the system and 
application logs they do not record the date and timestamp of when the particular 
action took place. 
From a digital forensic investigation perspective, although these command line 
utilities and various log files are very useful, they lack any form of integrity check or 
error detection information attached to their output. To address this problem the DEB 
framework can not only be used to encapsulate the output generated by these 
commands but also to record timestamp and integrity information. This is 
accomplished using the DEB Command Line wrapper application (see section 4.3). 
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5.3 Magnetic Stripe Card Cloning devices 
The DEB framework permits the storage of digital information acquired from a range 
of disparate digital devices (Masters & Turner 2007). For example, information 
obtained from magnetic stripe card cloning devices can be stored in a DEB. 
A magnetic stripe card (swipe card) is a type of card capable of storing digital data by 
recording a magnetic pattern within a stripe on the reverse of the card. Swipe cards 
are commonly used for applications including credit cards, department store (loyalty) 
cards and mobile (or cell) telephone `top-up' cards. There are three data tracks within 
a magnetic stripe. A credit card typically uses only tracks one and two. 
Track 1 typically stores the primary account number, card holder's name and card 
expiration date. This track can also be used to contain `discretionary' data maintained 
by the card issuer. Depending on the issuing authority, this discretionary data may, 
but not necessarily, be used for PIN or card verification and transaction counting 
purposes. 
" Track 1- 76 alphanumeric characters 
- Start Sentinel =% 
- Format Code, B= Bank/financial format 
- Primary Account Number (PAN), up to 19 digits 
- Name, 2-26 characters 
- Expiry Date 
Example 
%B0123456789123456^MR A SMITH^0612...? 
Track 2, developed by the banking industry, typically stores a copy of track 1, but 
without the cardholder's name, and a `service code' entry related to card security 
functions, such as the type of transaction permitted (cash only, goods and services 
only or ATM (Automatic Teller Machine -'hole-in-the-wall') with PIN verification). 
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0 Track 2- 37 numeric characters 
- Start Sentinel 
- Primary Account Number (PAN), up to 19 digits 
- Expiry Date -4 characters 
- Service Code -3 characters (sss) 
- Discretionary Data (DD) - PIN / Card Verification 
Example 
; 0123456789123456=0612sssDD...? 
Track 3- Not usually used for financial transaction cards 
0 Track 3- 104 numeric data characters 
- Start Sentinel =+ 
- Field Code (FC) 
- Primary Account Number (PAN), up to 19 digits 
Example 
+ FC0123456789123456=...? 
A number of ISO/IEC standards define both the physical layout and construction 
details of a magnetic swipe card and the data format of the tracks: 
" ISO/IEC 7810 - Physical characteristics of credit cards; 
" ISO/IEC 7811 (1-6) - Embossing, Track location, Lo / Hi coercivity; 
" ISO/IEC 7813 - Financial Transaction Cards; 
" ISO/IEC 4909 - Card Data Format - Track 3. 
There are many magnetic stripe card readers or skimmers, as they are commonly 
known, produced by a small number of manufacturers. These devices are marketed 
for legitimate commercial retailers. They also have become increasingly used for 
fraudulent activities. An example of a portable magnetic stripe device is shown below 
(Figure 28 and Figure 29) with a brief synopsis of their features: 
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" Standalone, battery powered - CPL2032 buttrin cell 
" She - L5Orre-n x W30rra-n x H3 PS mm 
" Reads 3 Track: s 
" 512K bytes memory - up to 2045 records 
" 85232 / TJ SB interface connections 
" PRI protected -4 di }t 
" Software deletes records/wipes information from device when saved 
rar 
Figure 28 - MSR-500M (Mini -123) Magnetic Swipe Card Reader 
" Ability to read and write m agnetic track data 
" Track reathn writing options 1,2&3,1 &2,2 
" Hi/LoCoerci-vity 
"S erial I TJS B IPS22 Cc nectiontypes 
" ý_ý n be use Cl to clceir tu irTiet. lc 't. r11: ir ca t i: ýS 
Figure 29 - MSR206 Magnetic Swipe Encoder 
The following shows a sample of the data that would be extracted from a Mini-123 
card reader. The card details are contained in records containing concatenated track 
information: 
Unit Login ID : 0000 
Actual Date & Time : 13/10/06 12: 12: 30 
Unit Date & Time : 200703142328394 
Product Version : 1.0R 16 
Number of records : 0001 
000,; 8944129990123456789=99121010000000000? 2006/11/09 09: 35: 39 53F 
This track information requires interpretation in order to present it in a more human 
readable format. The decoded track information from the Mini-123 is shown below: 
Record: 000 
Timestamp 09: 35: 39 09/11/2006 
No Track 1 data 
No Track 3 data 
TRACK 2 
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--". ... - n.. 
Account Code: 8944129990123456789 
Valid From: 12/99 
Some of the applications packaged with skimmers are almost anti-forensic in nature 
as they actually delete the information contained in the skimmer once downloaded to 
a computer. Furthermore, they may even require a basic password in order to access 
the stored data. To overcome some of these problems, bespoke applications are 
required by the forensic investigator to connect to the device and extract the 
information in a forensically sound manner. 
The following example (Figure 30) shows how the data contained within a Mini-123 
magnetic stripe card reader can be stored in a DEB. It can be seen that integrity check 
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Digital Evidence 
Bag 
... ............................ Figure 30 - Digital Evidence Bag schematic of skimmer information 
The DEB tag file would contain the following information: 
" DEB reference identifier/ exhibit number; 
" details of the evidence contained in the DEB (e. g. Mini-123 Magnetic Card 
Reader data); 
" the name and organisation of the person capturing the information; 
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" the date and time the capture process started; 
"a list of Evidence Units (EUs) contained in the DEB; 
"a hash of each Index and Bag file contained in the DEB; 
" tag seal number comprised of a hash of the tag file to date; this is equivalent to 
the traditional seal number; 
9 the format definition of information stored in the Index file. 
The index file in this scenario utilises a basic index reference structure (Record 
Number <Rnum> and Record Length <Rlen>) and associated integrity check 
information (MD5 hash <hmd5>) associated with the actual magnetic swipe card data 
extracted from the Mini- 123 device that is contained in the bag file. 
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6 Comparison of DEB framework with other Evidence Storage Formats 
The DEB framework is now compared with a number of other formats, both EnCase 
and Raw have been discussed in Chapter 2 as they are the most prevalent and 
supported formats currently in use. Details of the other formats discussed in this 
chapter are available as detailed below: 
6.1 Digital Forensic Image Storage Formats 
6.1.1 Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) 
AFF is developed by Basis Technology Corporation and Simson Garfinkel, and 
implements a segmented file specification. Segments can include media image data or 
associated metadata. The format provides an extensible approach to the storage of 
metadata through the use of name/value pairs. The format also supports image data 
compression through the use of ZLIB and MD5 or SHA-1 integrity assurance digests. 
Further details of the format together with a library of tools are available from 
www. afflib. org [Accessed : 29 September 2007]. 
6.1.2 Expert Witness - EnCase - SMART 
The Expert Witness format is the predecessor to that currently used in the EnCase and 
SMART toolsets. It was used for the storage of disk images. The format is not 
published but is believed to be virtually identical to the published Expert Witness 
Compression format used by SMART (see below). Due to a legal dispute between the 
creators of this format it is worth mentioning because of its historical interest in 
forming the basis of the EnCase format. 
6.1.3 EnCase 
The current EnCase format is an enhancement of the earlier Expert Witness format. 
Its basic structure and the metadata that it is capable of storing is described in earlier 
chapters but its detailed specification is not published. It is capable of storing disk 
images and those acquired from Palm PDA devices. It utilises MD5 digests to assure 
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the integrity of the captured media data and a series of Adler32 CRCs for error 
detection across smaller blocks of data (usually 32K). 
6.1.4 SMART 
This is defined by ASR Data and is also used for hard disk images. There are actually 
two SMART formats. The default format stores metadata in separate text files. 
Although the layout and structure of this is not published, the contents may be easily 
viewed. The second format produced by the SMART toolset is the Expert Witness 
Compression format. It stores the same set of metadata as the EnCase format. 
Specification details are available from www. asrdata. com/SMART/whitepaper. html 
[Accessed: 29 September 2007]. 
6.1.5 Generic Forensic Zip (Gfzip) 
The Generic Forensic Zip format is an open design produced by Rob J. Meijer. It uses 
data structures similar to AFF. However, the storage of media information and 
associated metadata is different. The format stores metadata after the acquired media 
data within the file. The format stores disk images that can be uncompressed (that are 
compatible with `raw' format images) or compressed. The SHA-256 digest algorithm 
is used for integrity assurance. Additionally, X509 certificates and signatures are used 
to authenticate the contents of the image file. Other features of this format include the 
support for a `packed' storage method which reduces the storage required for identical 
blocks of information and support for encryption. Details of Gfzip are available from 
www. non nu. or /ggfzip/filespec. html [Accessed : 29 September 2007]. 
6.1.6 ProDiscover 
This format is defined by Technology Pathways for use in their range of products and 
is used for hard disk images. The format incorporates metadata in the image data 
header structure and supports the use of MD5 or SHA-1 integrity digests. The 
metadata that the format is capable of storing includes: 
Name of Technician; 
Name of Source Disk; 
Make of Hard Disk: 
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Number of free sectors, Bad sectors and clusters; 
Number of image splits; 
Current Timezone and whether daylight saving is in operation. 
Compression is also supported by dividing the source into I MB blocks although no 
algorithm is given in the specification. The format is open and published and is 
available from www. techpathways. com/uploads/ProDiscoverImageFileFormatv4 pdf 
[Accessed : 29 September 2007]. 
6.2 Format Comparison 
From the outset, the DEB framework was designed to be easy to understand and to 
provide a more flexible and efficient way of storing digital evidence to meet the 
requirements identified in section 2.4. This is achieved by imitating the terminology 
and features used on the physical evidence storage containers of bags, tags and 
tamper-proof seals (section 3.1.1) that are used universally by law enforcement 
agencies. However, this concept is not the case with all other formats used for 
evidence storage. 
DEBs are capable of recording descriptive information and metadata relating to the 
source of the information contained within it. For example, the make, model, serial 
number, photographs and descriptive information of the device being captured. Other 
formats such as the EnCase Evidence file format and ProDiscover formats are limited 
to the storage of a short textual description, but no other metadata can be associated 
with the evidence at commencement of the capture process. 
Additionally, DEBs can be used to record the provenance of information contained 
within them. For example, the folder path of a particular file, its physical sector 
location and the logical cluster number can all be stored. In contrast, other evidence 
storage formats capture information into a single data block and rely upon the analysis 
tools to decode and interpret the inherent filing system structure. 
Because of the volume of information stored on modern storage media the acquisition 
of data into a single file would make backup and duplication on other media 
cumbersome. To alleviate this problem. and in common with other storage formats. 
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DEBs permit the fragmentation of information into segments ('splits' in ProDiscover 
terminology), the size of which can be specified by the investigator. 
One of the major differentiators between the DEB approach and every other storage 
format is that it permits the storage of selected information from the source media. 
For example, if a selective imager is used, particular categories of information can be 
captured into discrete DEBs or EUs together with its provenance. This facility is not 
supported in any other format. The closest feature that is available is the logical 
evidence file that can be created using EnCase. This permits the extraction of 
particular data from a case into a new evidence file but does not store any associated 
provenance information. 
The DEB framework uses an index file to record the type and source of information 
contained within the bag file. This feature is also not available with any other 
evidential storage format. Dictionary indexes are used by some forensic analysis tools 
to permit a fast keyword search capability but are not used for the storage of 
information. The dictionary indexes are created following media acquisition. 
In common with other digital evidence storage formats the DEB framework uses 
cryptographic hash signatures (digests) to assure the integrity of the information 
contained within the file. However, whereas the hash functions used within other 
formats are fixed (e. g. MD5 digest), the DEB framework is extensible. The initial 
DEB definition permits the use of MD5 or SHA digests to be specified, additional 
algorithms can be `plugged in' as they are developed in the future without requiring 
wholesale format redefinition. 
In addition to assuring the integrity of any data captured in a bag file the DEB format 
also uses identical integrity assurance mechanisms for the case metadata stored in the 
tag file. This is in contrast to the EnCase and Expert Witness formats which rely 
solely on weaker CRC integrity algorithms for this category of data. 
The DEB format also allows for flexible data storage from any type of digital device. 
Only the `raw' data format permits this whereas the AFF, EnCase, Gfzip and 
ProDiscover style formats are limited to digital media storage (hard disk. CD, DVD) 
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and encapsulation. DEBs achieve this flexibility by using a series of meta-tags to 
specify the index file format and structure. This system is also extensible, so should a 
new category of device information be required to be stored in a DEB, then this can 
be accommodated with a minor revision to the DEB definition. The meta-tags defined 
currently permit DEBs to store hard disk images, logical files, command line output, 
network traffic, text-based records, memory dumps and other digital information. 
The DEB format also permits the multiple provenance locations of information to be 
captured. For example, for a given file the folder path, logical cluster number within 
the volume and physical sector number locations on the media can be stored. This 
feature is also not supported in any other evidence storage format. 
In contrast to all other digital evidence storage formats, the DEB framework contains 
a dynamic and a static component. The tag file provides a mechanism to record all 
applications and processes that are used to access the whole DEB or individual EUs. 
Other storage formats are purely static containers; such that once digital data has been 
captured, no aspect of the container may be changed without rendering either the 
whole of the evidence or a small proportion of it unreliable. The DEB framework also 
permits the DEB to be `re-sealed' on completion of an examination or analysis 
operation. The ability to record that the DEB has been accessed together with a 
signature, functional description and timestamp of the operation being performed is 
also unique. 
Some digital evidence storage formats permit the captured data to be compressed. The 
algorithm used in all current formats is fixed. Additionally, the compression function 
would be applied over the whole of the captured data stream. In some cases this is not 
efficient since trying to compress already compressed data can be time consuming and 
result in larger generated output than the original. In contrast to this the DEB 
framework is capable of supporting different compression algorithms and optionally 
certain types of information could be selected for compression. For example. it may 
be desirable to capture word processing documents with compression into one EU, 
and use another EU to store uncompressed movie files. 
Page 108 
The DEB framework also supports the use of encryption at the granularity level of 
EUs. This allows differing levels of protection to be placed around certain categories 
of information. 
Table 3 compares the DEB framework with the other commercial tools described 
earlier; this is based on the authors knowledge and experience in this field. 
Additionally, the features of the tools are correlated with the requirements of imaging 
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6.3 DEB Associated Work 
The term `Digital Evidence Bag' has also been used in another piece of research work 
that was undertaken for the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) by Wetstone 
Technology. 
The paper is entitled SI-F1 (Synthesizing Information From Forensic Investigations), 
G. Hosmer, G. Gordon, C. Siedsma, J. Hosmer - AFRL-IF-RS-TR-2002-12, February 
2002. Available from: 
http: //stinet. dtic. mil/cii- 
bin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA402491 &Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc. pdf 
[Accessed: 24 September 2007]. 
The term DEB was used within the paper for the definition of an XML schema that 
describes all the various items of information that could be stored as part of a digital 
investigation. The paper does not define any specific format for digital evidence 
storage. 
This topic was re-visited in the paper entitled Digital Evidence Bag, C. Hosmer, 
Communications of the ACM, February 2006, Volume 49, No. 2, Pages 69-70. This 
paper refers to the SI-Fl project and highlights the need for auditing in the digital 
world and the need to maintain permanent audit records throughout the lifecycle of a 
system, although no further technical detail is provided. Apart from these two 
publications the work on the SI-Fl project appears to have ceased with no further 
publications or technical details available. 
The requirements of the SI-Fl project are: 
1) The SI-FI system must support a variety of evidence collection, extraction, 
examination and analysis technologies: 
2) The SI-FI system must be heterogeneous in order to support evidence 
collection, examination and analysis technologies on multiple heterogeneous 
computing platforms; 
3) The approach must support a broad range of tuber forensic data: 
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4) Digital evidence by its very nature can be collected globally; therefore, 
synthesis of'collected evidence must be possible regardless where the physical 
systems or networks exist; 
S) The examination or sharing of the collected evidence must also be globally 
accessible by experts, investigators, and examiners anywhere and at anytime; 
6) The integrity of digital evidence must be maintained. The SI-FI system must 
protect the integrity of evidence throughout its useful life; 
7) The privacy of the digital evidence especially when communicated over public 
networks such as the internet must be maintained at all times; 
8) Access to digital evidence must be regulated by strict policy and only those 
with authenticated privileges should be granted access to specific evidence; 
9) The digital evidence must be tamperproof 
10) Any SI-FI system must be accessible and useable by a variety of users with 
different levels of technical knowledge. Whenever possible the handling, 
policies and procedures applied to digital evidence should mimic established 
evidence handling processes; 
11) All derived evidentiary data should be referenced to the original source 
evidence; 
12) Detailed audit trail information must be maintained regarding each piece of 
evidence collected. This can include information pertaining to how evidence 
was collected, by whom, when, how (what tools were used), investigative 
techniques employed, etc. 
The SI-Fl project uses three XML schema representations, these are CASE, Digital 
Evidence Descriptor (DED) and Digital Evidence Bag (DEB). 
CASE 
The grouping of digital evidence at the highest level is accomplished by defining a 
Case (CASE) XML schema. A CASE contains information such as the identity of the 
person responsible for the case, legal information, and references (URLs) to all of the 
DEB(s) associated with the case. There is no cryptographic binding by the DED of 
evidence to a specific case. 
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DED 
Digital evidence is uniquely identified and preserved by binding information (such as 
who collected it, what was collected, why it was collected, ii here it was collected, and 
how it was collected) cryptographically with the evidence file. A Digital Evidence 
Descriptor (DED) XML schema was defined to facilitate storing information and its 
cryptographic binding to the evidence file. 
DEB 
The Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) XML scheme provides a container for defining the 
location of a Digital Evidence Descriptor (DED) and the location of the digital 
evidence file to which it is cryptographically bound. Digital Evidence can exist in 
multiple physical locations, yet still be the same piece of evidence. If the physical 
location of the evidence file and the actual evidence file were bound 
cryptographically the evidence would be bound to exist in a specific location. 
Organisations can share digital evidence by transferring DED(s)/evidence file(s) and 
store the evidence in new DEB(s). 
The SI-FI project uses a web based Client-Server architecture to support these 
schemes. However specific design details or prototype demonstrators were not 
available to provide a direct comparison with the DEB framework enumerated in this 
thesis. 
As expected there is a fair degree of overlap between the SI-FI requirements and the 
Digital Evidence Bag framework and requirements described in Chapters 2 to 4. 




" Tool certification. 
" Training / education aid. 
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7 Conclusions & Recommendations for Future Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
The objectives of this work (defined in section 1.2) was to produce an efficient 
scalable framework that is capable of recording the provenance, process, methods, 
tools and actions taken by the investigator. This is achieved by implementing and 
enhancing the methods used in traditional physical evidence handling and applying 
them in the digital environment. The DEB framework provides a more comprehensive 
provenance, continuity and process recording and audit mechanism than the tag used 
in traditional evidence handling methods. Additionally it applies stronger integrity 
assurance mechanisms than tamper-proof bags and seals. Information can be further 
protected using encryption methods or more efficiently use available storage space 
using compression. 
The DEB framework defined in Chapter 3, provides a totally new method and facility 
for the storage of digital evidence. It uses terminology to describe the various 
components of the framework that are analogous to those already used in the law 
enforcement, legal and investigative domains. The simple terminology makes it easy 
to comprehend the function or purpose of each component. This is essential for 
allowing it to be easily understood by the judiciary and members of the public who 
may be unfamiliar with digital evidence concepts. Therefore it does not obfuscate or 
detract from the evidence that is stored within a DEB. 
The framework permits new capture methodologies (section 5.1.2 and 5.1.3) to be 
developed which provide viable alternatives to the `capture everything' approach that 
has been used extensively in the digital forensic arena until now. The adoption of this 
type of flexible approach should permit the tools and techniques that are used to 
acquire, process and analyse digital evidence to further develop and also to better 
keep pace with the ever increasing quantities of digitally stored information. 
Digital forensic techniques have been severely inhibited by the lack of standardisation 
in the field. Most tool vendors develop their own format (section 2.2.1) which is often 
not published thus preventing independent verification, assessment or compatible 
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tools to be developed. This `black box' approach to evidence storage is short-sighted 
and stifles the development of new analysis tools. It effectively `locks in' an 
investigator to a specific toolset or requires the conversion into another format thus 
resulting in additional overhead in terms of time, storage and labour cost. 
The presentation of the DEB framework to the International digital forensic 
community has created much interest and re-evaluation of the methods used to 
capture digital information for evidential purposes. The creation of the Common 
Digital Evidence Storage Format working group (CDESF 2006) is recognition of the 
value in taking a fresh look at the basic building blocks that form the cornerstone of a 
digital forensic investigation - the capture methods used for digital evidence. Also 
highlighted by the difficulties encountered in progressing the working group activity 
is acknowledgment that it is a non-trivial task that is being undertaken and that 
considerable time, effort and foresight are required to conclude this work. The easy 
option is to maintain the status quo and utilise whatever facilities any individual tool 
vendor chooses to implement. The creation of a formally established International 
Standards activity would improve: 
" digital forensic tool verification; 
" practitioner training; 
" laboratory accreditation; 
" inter jurisdiction investigations and evidence transfer; 
" academic understanding of digital forensic problems and issues; 
" legislation. 
Additionally, the novel approach taken by the DEB framework is apparent with the 
patent application documentation that has been prepared during the course of this 
work (Appendix Q. To date the main concepts and claims within this approach have 
not been countered by any national or international searches for prior art conducted 
independently by the UK Patent Office or associated International counterparts. 
This thesis has defined and illustrated the DEB framework and applied its concepts in 
a number of scenarios (Chapter 5) that are commonly encountered in digital forensics. 
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It demonstrates that a common structure can be applied to the storage of information 
acquired in traditional static and dynamic live incident response environments. A 
DEB API (Chapter 3) has been defined that provides the functionality required of 
applications that create and analyse the information stored within a DEB. A Delphi 
Pascal API implementation has been developed (Chapter 4) that has been 
incorporated into a number of application demonstrators that successfully illustrate 
the flexibility of the DEB framework. 
Table 4 summarises the digital forensic imaging and analysis tool requirements 
identified in section 2.4 and correlates these with features provided by the DEB 
framework. 
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Requirement DEB framework features 
Record provenance Stored in DEB Header - see sections 
3.3.1.1,3.4.1 and4.1. 
Record continuity Stored in TCBs - see sections 3.3.1.4. 
3.4.5 and 4.2. 
Maintain integrity Achieved through the use of 
cryptographic hashes in DEB tag and 
index components - see section 3.4.3. 
Record audit trail of process / Stored in TCB and Case Notes in EUO - 
assumptions / through processes / see sections 3.3.1.4,3.4.6,4.3 and 5.2. 
application used / actions / functions / 
errors. 
Repeatability / reliability Audit trail of application version and 
functional description recorded in TCB - 
see section 3.3.1.4 
Proportionate Supports selective acquisition methods 
that can be tailored to the aims of the 
investigation - see sections 5.1.2 to 5.1.4. 
Training / Education aid The comprehensive auditing could be 
used as a training aid and to enhance best 
practice. See sections 4.3 and 5.2. 
Efficiency - processing / searching / DEB EUs permit the structured 
backup. decomposition and grouping of similar 
types of information - see sections 
3.3.1.2 and 3.5.1.7. The DEB framework 
supports selectable compression, and 
encryption algorithms - see sections 
3.5.1.9 and 3.5.1.10. 
Tool certification / testing The DEB API provides a mechanism that 
could be used for assurance and 
certification of digital forensic 
applications - see section 3.6. 
Multi-investigator support The TCB could be used for this - see 
section 3.3.1.4. 
Support for disparate range of digital This is demonstrated in the various 
devices and environments. scenarios discussed in Chapter 5 
Table 4- DEB Framework & Requirements Correlation 
7.2 Recommendations for Further Work 
When compared with other storage methods DEBs provide high flexibility and a 
number of features that are not implemented by other methods. A number of 
additional features could be added that would further enhance the framework. The 
following features are suggested for incorporation into the DEB framework definition: 
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9 Integrate a public key cryptographic system within the DEB framework. This 
would enhance confidentiality and restrict access to authorised personnel. The 
current definition only supports symmetric key encryption methods for the 
index and bag file contents. 
9 Implement an error correction system to automatically repair the contents of a 
DEB should a component become corrupt. Error detection is already possible 
through the use of cryptographic digests embedded within the tag and index 
components. This could be further extended using error correction 
technologies similar to that incorporated into the parity archive system that 
was developed for Usenet data transfer - http: //parchive. sourceforge. net/. To 
accommodate this method an Evidence Unit could be used that contains all the 
information required to rebuild any other EU within the DEB. However, 
further work is required to validate this approach. Any self-repairing process 
that was carried out should also be logged. 
" Further consideration is required for the mechanism by which DEB 
components can be accessed or distributed in a parallel or grid processing 
environment. 
9 Similarly, further development is required to extend the DEB analysis protocol 
in order to maintain the integrity and reliability of DEB transactional 
processing. This specifies the sequence that a DEB analysis application should 
follow to access the contents of a DEB. In addition, the ability to add new EUs 
by the analysis application that contain distilled or analysed information as 
opposed to simply extracting data from a DEB into `plain' files or another 
DEB. 
" Although the concept of 'Intelligent Imaging' is supported by the DEB 
framework. further consideration is required into how investigative domain 
expertise could be captured and incorporated into an intelligent imaging 
system. 
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" Another feature that requires further consideration is the mechanism by which 
media acquisition errors are recorded within a DEB. 
" The process by which a DEB bag file can contain another DEB or pointers to 
other bags is also required. 
9 Further consideration and guidance is required to formalise the protocol that is 
used in order for new and disparate devices to utilise the DEB framework. 
This thesis demonstrates how DEBs incorporate traditional digital forensic 
scenarios such as device imaging, command line utility capture and even 
credit card skimming devices. A formal methodology and process for the 
registration and documentation for incorporating disparate devices in a 
standardised way into DEBs aids interoperability between independently 
developed acquisition and analysis applications, and thus permits formal 
certification and verification of those applications. The requirement for an 
official registration facility for the registration of DEB content, integrity, 
compression, encryption and Meta-Tag types was identified in section 3.5 of 
this thesis. However, if this is extended to incorporate formal registration, 
certification and testing of digital forensic products then this would 
significantly advance the scientific rigor and maturing of digital forensics as a 
forensic science. 
In summary, the DEB framework provides the majority of features expected of any 
digital evidence storage format and provides a more flexible and extensible system 
than any other format. Some degree of future-proofing of the DEB framework may be 
gained by the implementation of some of the features suggested in the further work 
discussion. 
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Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) conference 2003,6-8th August, 
Cleveland, Ohio, USA. 
2004 - Challenges to the adaptation of current digital forensic practice to the 
operational realm - Panel Member 
Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFR WS) conference 2004,11-13th .4 ugust, 
Baltimore, Maryland, USA. 
Available from : 
ý\ ww dfrws or. (,, /2 004/da} 2 /Day2-Panel -Discussion-v?. ppt [Accessed 9 September 
2007] 
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2005 - Research Needs of Law Enforcement - Panel Member 
Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) conference 2005,17-19th August, 
New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. 
2005 - Unification of digital evidence from disparate sources (Digital Evidence Bags) 
Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) conference 2005,1 7 -19th August, 
New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. 
Available from : 
www. dfrws. or /2ý 005/proceedings/turner evidencebags. pdf 
www. dfrws. org/2005/proceedings/turner evidencebags slides. pdf 
[Accessed 9 September 2007] 
2006 - Selective and Intelligent imaging using digital evidence bags 
Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) conference 2006,14-16th August, 
Lafayette, Indiana, USA. 
Available from : 
www. dfrws. or /2g 006/proceedings/8-Turner. pdf 
www. dfrws. org/2006/proceedings/8-Tumer-pres. pdf 
[Accessed 6 September 2007] 
2006 - Digital Evidence Bags 
F3 Annual Conference 25-26 October 2007, Gloucestershire, UK. 
2007 Digital Evidence Provenance and Continuity using Digital Evidence Bags 
'"`/ Conference on Advances in 
Computer Security and Forensics (ACSF) 
Liverpool John Moores University - 12-13 July 2007. Liverpool. UK 
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2007 Forensic data recovery and examination of magnetic swipe card cloning devices 
Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFR WS) conference 2007,13th-15th August, 
Pittsburgh, PA, USA. 
Available from : 
www. dfrws. orý4/2007/proceedings/p 007/proceedings/p 16-masters. pdf 
[Accessed 6 September 2007] 
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9 Appendix A- Published papers 
9.1 Digital provenance - interpretation, verification and corroboration 
9.2 Unification of digital evidence from disparate sources 
9.3 Digital Evidence Provenance and Continuity using DEBs 
9.4 Selective and Intelligent imaging using digital evidence bags 
9.5 Applying a forensic approach to incident response, network investigation and 
system administration using Digital Evidence Bags 
9.6 Standardizing Digital Evidence Storage - The Common Digital Evidence 
Storage Format Working Group 
9.7 Forensic data recovery and examination of magnetic swipe card cloning 
devices 
9.8 Digital Forensics : Challenges and Opportunities 







11 Appendix C- Patent application 
The DEB framework and concept has also formed the basis of a patent application 
sponsored by QinetiQ (Appendix D). The date of filing of this application was 25 
May 2005, application number 0510878.2 and been moved forward for international 
filing with International application number PCT/GB2006/001942. 
The current status of the application can be found at the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation web site: 
www. wipo. int/pctdb/en/wo. j sp? wo=2006126006&IA=WO2006126006&DISPLAY= 
STATUS [Accessed 9 September 2007] 
The claims of the patent application are: 
1. A method of capturing digital data, the method comprising the steps of 
" copying digital data from a data source into one or more evidence files: 
" for each evidence file recording data descriptive of at least one of the source 
and the contents of the digital data in the evidence file: 
" recording, in a tag file, data indicative of provenance of the digital data in the 
one or more evidence files. 
2. A method according to any preceding claim in which digital data is copied into a 
plurality of evidence files. 
3. A method according to any preceding claim in which the digital data is selectively 
copied from the data source into the one or more evidence files. 
4. A method according to any preceding claim in which, for each evidence file, the 
data descriptive of one of the source and contents of the digital data is stored in an 
index file distinct from the evidence file. 
5. A method according to claim 4 in which a distinct index file is created, 
for each 
evidence file. 
6. A method according to any preceding claim in which at 
least the data descriptive of 
one of the source and contents of the digital data comprises a 
digital fingerprint of the 
digital data. 
7. A method according to any preceding claim in which the tag 
file comprises a 
digital fingerprint of at least one of the evidence files. 
8. A method according to any preceding claim 
in which the tag file comprises a 
description of the format of the data descriptive of one of the source and contents of 
the digital data. 
9. A method according to am preceding claim 
in which the data source is a data 
storage medium. 
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10. A method according to any preceding claim in which the data source is a data 
transmission medium. 
11. A method according to any preceding claim in which multiple indications of 
provenance are associated with at least one given item of the digital data in the one 
or more evidence files. 
12. A program for a computer having respective code portions and data structures to 
perform the steps of the methods of any one of claims 1- 11. 
13. Apparatus for capturing digital data, the apparatus comprising: 
" means for copying digital data from a data source into one or more evidence 
files; 
" for each evidence file, means for recording data descriptive of at least one of 
the source and the contents of the digital data in the evidence file; 
" means arranged to record, in a tag file, data indicative of provenance of the 
digital data in the one or more evidence files. 
14. A data structure for capturing digital data, the data structure comprising: 
" at least one evidence file for containing digital data copied from a data 
source; 
" at least one index file containing data descriptive of at least one of the source 
and contents of the digital data in the at least one evidence files; 
"a tag file containing data indicative of provenance of the digital data in the at 
least one evidence files. 
15. A method of accessing a data structure according to claim 13, the method 
comprising the steps of 
" identifying one or more evidence files to be accessed; 
" recording details of the evidence file access in the tag file of the data 
structure; 
" recording a new integrity check value in the tag file, responsive to the contents 
of the tag file including the newly-recorded details of the evidence file access. 
16. A method according to claim 15 in which the details of the evidence file access 
comprise at least one of. 
" identification of the application performing the evidence file access; 
" identification of the user requesting evidence file access; 
" identification of the time of evidence file access; 
17. A method according to any one of claims 16-17 in which the integrity check is a 
digital fingerprint . 
18. A method according to claim 17 in which the digital 
fingerprint is one of a CRC 
digits, an MD5 hash, and a SHA hash. 
19. Apparatus for accessing a data structure according to claim 1-4, the apparatus 
comprising: 
" means for identifi'ing one or more evidence, files to 
be acce. ssccl: 
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" means for recording details of the evidence file access in the tag file of the 
data structure: 
" means for recording a new integrity check value in the tag file, responsive to 
the contents of the tag file including the newly-recorded details of the evidence 
file access. 
20. A method of updating a data structure according to claim 14. the method 
comprising the steps of: 
" accessing the data structure to extract evidential data contained 11-ithin it: 
" processing evidential data extracted from the data structure to create a new 
evidence file and corresponding index file; 
" adding the new evidence file and index file to the existing data structure; 
" appending continuity information to the tag file of the data structure indicative 
of the addition of the new evidence file and index file. 
21. Apparatus for updating a data structure according to claim 14. the apparatus 
comprising: 
" means for accessing the data structure to extract evidential data contained 
within it, 
" means for processing evidential data extracted from the data structure to 
create a new evidence file and corresponding index file; 
" means for adding the new evidence file and index file to the existing data 
structure; 
" means for appending continuity information to the tag file of the data 
structure indicative of the addition of the new evidence file and index file. 
22. Data structures, methods, apparatus, systems, and programs for computers for 
digital data capture and processing substantially as described in the foregoing 
specification and with reference to the accompanying drawings. 
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